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и всеобщей истории

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**ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА США
ВО ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XX в. – НАЧАЛЕ XXI
в. Сборник документов 1953–1968 гг.**

Выпуск 2

Учебное пособие



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Во второй части учебного пособия представлены документы (1953-1968) на английском языке, определившие становление внешнеполитических приоритетов США в разгар Холодной войны. Приведен краткий анализ документов и причин их появления. Сформулированы вопросы, темы рефератов и презентаций к каждому документу.

Пособие рекомендуется бакалаврам и магистрам, обучающимся по направлениям «История», «Международные отношения», «Политология» и изучающим дисциплины «Новейшая история», «Внешняя политика ведущих европейских государств и США в XX-XXI вв.: сравнительный анализ», «Внешняя политика США в XX-XXI вв.», «Военные доктрины США - история и современность», «Всеобщая история».

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**Внешняя политика США во второй половине XX в – начале XXI в. Вып. 2.
Сборник документов 1953–1968 гг.
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ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Во вторую часть учебного пособия включены наиболее важные документы и материалы по новейшей истории, освещающие основные проблемы внешнеполитической деятельности США в 1950-е–1960-е гг. Издание предназначено для студентов, аспирантов и преподавателей исторических и политологических факультетов вузов. Помимо анализа внешней политики США, оно имеет целью оказать практическую помощь в преподавании курса новейшей истории и политики стран Европы и Америки.

В пособии представлены инаугурационные речи Президентов (ежегодные послания Конгрессу, речи на совместном заседании палат Конгресса и пр.), выступления государственных деятелей – Госсекретаря, министров, конгрессменов и др., публицистические работы известных американских политиков.

В пособие включены документы, характеризующие период правления президентов Дуайта Эйзенхауэра (1953–1961), Джона Кеннеди (1961–1963), Линдона Джонсона (1963–1969). Именно в этот период происходит институализация американской внешней политики периода «Холодной войны», с учетом новых вызовов трансформируются внешнеполитические приоритеты США.

Каждому документу предшествует краткое вступление – сведения о датировке, форме, авторе документа и пр.

Представленные документы помогут лучше разобраться в событиях того времени, представить атмосферу политической жизни США в 1950-е–60-е гг. XX в.

ГЛАВА 1. ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ Д. ЭЙЗЕНХАУЭРА (1953–1960 гг.)



После победы на президентских выборах в ноябре 1952 года кандидат от Республиканской партии, герой Второй Мировой Войны, главнокомандующий войсками НАТО в Европе Дуайт Эйзенхауэр столкнулся с серьезными вызовами на международной арене. Война в Корее показала, что если не будет создана международная система деэскалации, то неизбежно начнется новая мировая война. К началу 1950-х годов острое противостояние между двумя супердержавами и между двумя военно-политическими блоками приобрело глобальный характер. Перед новой администрацией на повестке дня встала двудесятилетняя задача, с одной стороны – упорядочить «конфликтное взаимодействие» с Москвой, с другой стороны – усилить давление на СССР. Кроме того, появился еще один новый фактор, который приходилось учитывать – это то, что президент и его окружение выступали за бездефицитный бюджет, так как являлись фискальными консерваторами. Это означало, что США стали требовать от союзников увеличить экономический и финансовый вклад в укрепление и развитие НАТО.

Главным архитектором внешней политики США в этот период стал известный эксперт в области международных отношений Джон Фостер Даллес, занявший пост государственного секретаря в 1953 г. В 1919 г., он в 31 год, был главным советником американской делегации на Парижской конференции. В межвоенные годы был старшим советником одной из ведущих юридических фирм на Уолл Стрит, специализировался в международном праве и консультировал по вопросам мировой политики всех американских президентов, вне зависимости от партийной принадлежности. Именно Джон Даллес стал автором доктрины «Освобождение от коммунизма», опираясь на которую США в 1950-е гг. не раз ставили мир на грань ядерной войны.

В данной главе представлены три документа:

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Inaugural Address, January 1953.
2. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 1954.
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: Inaugural Address, (January 1953)

Первая инаугурация Дуайта Эйзенхауэра состоялась 20 января 1953 года в Вашингтоне. Одновременно к присяге был приведён Ричард Никсон как 36-й вице-президент США.

Вступая в должность президента, Дуайт Эйзенхауэр выступил с традиционным посланием к гражданам страны. Не останавливаясь подробно на анализе конкретных событий, президент сделал акцент на концептуальном восприятии мировых процессов, перечислил принципы, которые должны лежать в основе внешней политики США, обозначил основные угрозы для страны на международной арене.



MY FRIENDS, before I begin the expression of those thoughts that I deem appropriate to this moment, would you permit me the privilege of uttering a little private prayer of my own. And I ask that you bow your heads:

Almighty God, as we stand here at this moment my future associates in the Executive branch of Government join me in beseeching that Thou will make full and complete our dedication to the service of the people in this throng, and their fellow citizens everywhere.

Give us, we pray, the power to discern clearly right from wrong, and allow all our words and actions to be governed thereby, and by the laws of this land. Especially we pray that our concern shall be for all the people regardless of station, race or calling.

May cooperation be permitted and be the mutual aim of those who, under the concepts of our Constitution, hold to differing political faiths; so that all may work for the good of our beloved country and Thy glory. Amen.

My fellow citizens:

The world and we have passed the midway point of a century of continuing challenge. We sense with all our faculties that forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history. This fact defines the meaning of this day. We are summoned by this honored and historic ceremony to witness more than the act of one citizen swearing his oath of service, in the presence of God. We are called as a people to give testimony in the sight of the world to our faith that the future shall belong to the free.

Since this century's beginning, a time of tempest has seemed to come upon the continents of the earth. Masses of Asia have awakened to strike off shackles of the past. Great nations of Europe have fought their bloodiest wars. Thrones have toppled and their vast empires have disappeared. New nations have been born.

For our own country, it has been a time of recurring trial. We have grown in power and in responsibility. We have passed through the anxieties of depression and of war to a summit unmatched in man's history. Seeking to secure peace in the world, we have had to fight through the forests of the Argonne to the shores of Iwo Jima, and to the cold mountains of Korea.

In the swift rush of great events, we find ourselves groping to know the full sense and meaning of these times in which we live. In our quest of understanding, we beseech God's guidance. We summon all our knowledge of the past and we scan all signs of the future. We bring all our wit and all our will to meet the question:

How far have we come in man's long pilgrimage from darkness toward the light? Are we nearing the light--a day of freedom and of peace for all mankind? Or are the shadows of another night closing in upon us?

Great as are the preoccupations absorbing us at home, concerned as we are with matters that deeply affect our livelihood today and our vision of the future, each of these domestic problems is dwarfed by, and often even created by, this question that involves all humankind.

This trial comes at a moment when man's power to achieve good or to inflict evil surpasses the brightest hopes and the sharpest fears of all ages. We can turn rivers in their courses, level mountains to the plains. Oceans and land and sky are avenues for our colossal commerce. Disease diminishes and life lengthens.

Yet the promise of this life is imperiled by the very genius that has made it possible. Nations amass wealth. Labor sweats to create--and turns out devices to level not only mountains but also cities. Science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet.

At such a time in history, we who are free must proclaim anew our faith. This faith is the abiding creed of our fathers. It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and natural laws. This faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those gifts of the Creator that are man's inalienable rights, and that make all men equal in His sight.

In the light of this equality, we know that the virtues most cherished by free people—love of truth, pride of work, devotion to country—all are treasures equally precious in the lives of the most humble and of the most exalted. The men who mine coal and fire furnaces, and balance ledgers, and turn lathes, and pick cotton, and heal the sick and plant corn—all serve as proudly and as profitably for America as the statesmen who draft treaties and the legislators who enact laws.

This faith rules our whole way of life. It decrees that we, the people, elect leaders not to rule but to serve. It asserts that we have the right to choice of our own work and to the reward of our own toil. It inspires the initiative that makes our productivity the wonder of the world. And it warns that any man who seeks to deny equality among all his brothers betrays the spirit of the free and invites the mockery of the tyrant.

It is because we, all of us, hold to these principles that the political changes accomplished this day do not imply turbulence, upheaval or disorder. Rather this change expresses a purpose of strengthening our dedication and devotion to the precepts of our founding documents, a conscious renewal of faith in our country and in the watchfulness of a Divine Providence.

The enemies of this faith know no god but force, no devotion but its use. They tutor men in treason. They feed upon the hunger of others. Whatever defies them, they torture, especially the truth.

Here, then, is joined no argument between slightly differing philosophies. This conflict strikes directly at the faith of our fathers and the lives of our sons. No principle or treasure that we hold, from the spiritual knowledge of our free schools and churches to the creative magic of free labor and capital, nothing lies safely beyond the reach of this struggle. Freedom is pitted against slavery; lightness against the dark.

The faith we hold belongs not to us alone but to the free of all the world. This common bond binds the grower of rice in Burma and the planter of wheat in Iowa, the shepherd in southern Italy and the mountaineer in the Andes. It confers a common dignity upon the French soldier who dies in Indo-China, the British soldier killed in Malaya, the American life given in Korea.

We know, beyond this, that we are linked to all free peoples not merely by a noble idea but by a simple need. No free people can for long cling to any privilege or enjoy any safety in economic solitude. For all our own material might, even we need markets in the world for the surpluses of our farms and our factories. Equally, we need for these same farms and factories vital materials and products of distant

lands. This basic law of interdependence, so manifest in the commerce of peace, applies with thousand-fold intensity in the event of war. So we are persuaded by necessity and by belief that the strength of all free peoples lies in unity; their danger, in discord.

To produce this unity, to meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world's leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we Americans know and we observe the difference between world leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies.

We wish our friends the world over to know this above all: we face the threat – not with dread and confusion – but with confidence and conviction. We feel this moral strength because we know that we are not helpless prisoners of history. We are free men. We shall remain free, never to be proven guilty of the one capital offense against freedom, a lack of staunch faith.

In pleading our just cause before the bar of history and in pressing our labor for world peace, we shall be guided by certain fixed principles. These principles are:

1. Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. For, as it must be the supreme purpose of all free men, so it must be the dedication of their leaders, to save humanity from preying upon itself.

2. In the light of this principle, we stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations, so as to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such effort are that-in their purpose-they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that-in their result-they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge.

3. Realizing that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.

4. Knowing that only a United States that is strong and immensely productive can help defend freedom in our world, we view our Nation's strength and security as a trust upon which rests the hope of free men everywhere. It is the firm duty of each of our free citizens and of every free citizen everywhere to place the cause of his country before the comfort, the convenience of himself.

5. Honoring the identity and the special heritage of each nation in the world, we shall never use our strength to try to impress upon another people our own cherished political and economic institutions.

6. Assessing realistically the needs and capacities of proven friends of freedom, we shall strive to help them to achieve their own security and well-being. Likewise, we shall count upon them to assume, within the limits of their resources, their full and just burdens in the common defense of freedom.

7. Recognizing economic health as an indispensable basis of military strength and the free world's peace, we shall strive to foster everywhere, and to practice ourselves, policies that courage productivity and profitable trade. For the impoverishment of any single people in the world means danger to the well-being of all other peoples.

8. Appreciating that economic need, military security and political wisdom combine to suggest regional groupings of free peoples, we hope, within the framework of the United Nations, to help strengthen such special bonds the world over. The nature of these ties must vary with the different problems of different areas.

In the Western Hemisphere, we enthusiastically join with all our neighbors in the work of perfecting a community of fraternal trust and common purpose.

In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality. Only as free Europe unitedly marshals its strength can it effectively safeguard, even with our help, its spiritual and cultural heritage.

9. Conceiving the defense of freedom, like freedom itself, to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.

10. Respecting the United Nations as the living sign of all people's hope for peace, we shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force. And in our quest for an honorable peace, we shall neither compromise, nor tire, nor ever cease.

By these rules of conduct, we hope to be known to all peoples.

By their observance, an earth of peace may become not a vision but a fact.

This hope--this supreme aspiration--must rule the way we live.

We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose.

We must be willing, individually and as a Nation, to accept whatever sacrifices may be required of us. A people that values its privileges above its principles soon loses both.

These basic precepts are not lofty abstractions, far removed from matters of daily living. They are laws of spiritual strength that generate and define our material strength. Patriotism means equipped forces and a prepared citizenry. Moral stamina means more energy and more productivity, on the farm and in the factory. Love of liberty means the guarding of every resource that makes freedom possible – from the sanctity of our families and the wealth of our soil to the genius of our scientists.

And so each citizen plays an indispensable role. The productivity of our heads, our hands and our hearts is the source of all the strength we can command, for both the enrichment of our lives and the winning of the peace.

No person, no home, no community can be beyond the reach of this call. We are summoned to act in wisdom and in conscience, to work with industry, to teach with persuasion, to preach with conviction, to weigh our every deed with care and with compassion. For this truth must be clear before us: whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America.

The peace we seek, then, is nothing less than the practice and fulfillment of our whole faith among ourselves and in our dealings with others. This signifies more than the stilling of guns, easing the sorrow of war. More than escape from death, it is a way of life. More than a haven for the weary, it is a hope for the brave.

This is the hope that beckons us onward in this century of trial. This is the work that awaits us all, to be done with bravery, with charity, and with prayer to Almighty God.

My citizens, I thank you.

Вопросы:

- В чем президенту видится особая роль США в продвижении идей свободы и прав человека, в борьбе с «тиранией» и «силами тьмы»?
- В чем заключается, по мнению президента, угроза со стороны врагов США?
- Говорил ли оратор о стремлении проводить политику сокращения вооружения ?
- Перечислите основные принципы, на которые, при проведении своей политики, будут опираться США ?
- Какова, по мнению президента, роль ООН в мировых делах ?
- Как Д.Эйзенхауэр видит сотрудничество с странами Западного полушария и Европы ?

Темы презентаций:

- Внешнеполитическая программа команды Дуайта Эйзенхауэра на президентских выборах 1952 г.
- Политический портрет Д. Далласа. Анализ его статей и выступлений.
- Антиялтинские настроения в Республиканской партии США. Попытки ревизии ялтинских соглашений.
- Корейский вопрос в предвыборной президентской компании 1952 г.

Темы рефератов:

- «Новый взгляд» на оборону. Доктрина «Массированного возмездия».
- Роль США в Корейской войне 1950–1953 гг.
- Милитаризация экономики США в начале президентского срока адм. Д. Эйзенхауэра.
- Поправка Брикера и борьба различных течений в американском истеблишменте.
- Директива СНБ – 162/2 и формулирование основных положений доктрины «Освобождение от коммунизма».

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, (Sept. 1954)



Одним из ключевых направлений внешней политики США в 1950-е гг. стало блокостроительство (пактомания). Именно оно, по мнению руководства страны, обеспечивало глобальное присутствие и глобальное доминирование США в мире. Пожалуй, самым значимым достижением в этой области стало создание в 1954 г. военно-политического блока государств Юго-Восточной Азии (СЕАТО).

8 сентября 1954 года в Маниле был подписан договор (Манильский пакт), который стал учредительным документом СЕАТО (Организации Договора Юго-Восточной Азии – Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty). В блок входило

8 стран – Австралия, Великобритания, Новая Зеландия, Франция, Таиланд, Филиппины, США и Пакистан. Организация осуществляла свою деятельность до 1977 г.

Анализ договора позволяет понять, какие принципы и идеи были заложены в политику блокостроительства.

The Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties, Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area.

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security, Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(1) TIAS 3170; 6 UST 81-86. Ratification advised by the Senate Feb. 1, 1955; ratified by the President Feb. 4, 1955; entered into force Feb. 19, 1955.

(2) Thailand deposited its instrument of ratification Dec. 2, 1954; the remaining signatories (the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom) deposited their instruments Feb. 19, 1955.



Вопросы:

- Почему в документе идут ссылки на Устав ООН ?
- Какие декларируются цели создания данной организации ?
- Предполагается ли какое-либо иное сотрудничество помимо военного между участниками договора ?
 - Какие действия должны предпринять участники организации в случае вооруженного нападения ?
 - Могут ли другие страны присоединиться к Договору, и – если могут – каковы условия и процедура ?
 - Какова процедура выхода страны из данной организации ?
 - В чем заключается особая роли государства Филиппины, и с какой целью был создан Совет (Council)?

Темы презентаций:

- Позиция США на Женевской конференции по Индокитаю в 1954 г.
- Причины появления и содержание «Теории падающего домино».
- Создание США военно-политического блока государств Юго-Восточной Азии (СЕАТО). Причины, цели, организационная структура.
- Реакция стран региона и мира на создание СЕАТО. Позиция различных политических сил внутри США.

Темы рефератов:

- Политика США в отношении стран третьего мира в первой половине 1950-х гг.
- Свержение режима Моссадыка в Иране в 1953 г. Последствия для регионов Ближнего и Среднего Востока.
- Военный переворот в Гватемале в 1954 г. Роль США.
- Багдадский пакт 1955 г. Пактомания.

- Тайваньский кризис 1954-1955 гг. Китайское направление внешней политики США.
- США и Суэцкий кризис 1956 г.
- «Доктрина Эйзенхауэра». Причины появления, содержание, влияние на Ближневосточную ситуацию.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961



Покидая пост президента в 1961 г., Дуайт Эйзенхауэр 17 января обратился с прощальной речью к нации, в которой предостерег американцев об опасности для демократии, которую несет усиление мощи и влияния ВПК. По его мнению, цели и задачи ВПК могут существенно отличаться от интересов общества и через свое возрастающее влияние оказывать негативное воздействие на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику США. Именно в этом выступлении Д. Эйзенхауэром был использован термин «военно-промышленный комплекс» («military-industrial complex»).

My fellow Americans:

I. Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation. My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II. We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III. Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology – global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle – with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our chartered course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research – these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs - balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage – balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the

individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV. A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system – ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V. Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we - you and I, and our government - must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI. Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war – as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years - I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII. So - in this my last good night to you as your President - I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I - my fellow citizens – need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

Вопросы:

- В чем заключается, по мнению президента» мощь Америки?
- Как определяются цели США?
- Почему президент говорит о балансе интересов и что он под этим понимает?
- Какова, по мнению президента, роль ВПК в американском обществе?
- Что говорит президент о влиянии ВПК на общественную и социально-экономическую сферы США ? В чем, по его мнению, заключается угроза?
- Что президент, в этой связи, говорит о роли технологической революции?
- Несет ли появление большого слоя технократической, научной элиты угрозу свободному обществу?
- Каким образом, по мнению оратора, можно сохранить мир и пойти по пути разоружения?

Темы презентаций:

- Женевская конференция (июль 1955 г.) как попытка смягчения напряженности на международной арене.
- Отношения между СССР и США в свете Венгерского и Суэцкого кризисов в середине 1950-х гг.

- Влияние Пентагона и ВПК на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику США.
- Новые приоритеты в военном строительстве США в конце 1950-х гг.

Темы рефератов:

- Отношения между США и Францией в конце 1950-х гг. Фактор генерала де Голля.
 - «Доктрина взаимозависимости» как новый этап во взаимоотношения США со странами НАТО.
 - Германский вопрос во взаимоотношениях СССР и США во второй половине 1950-х гг.
 - США и лаосский кризис в конце 1950-х гг.
 - Новая роль стран «третьего мира» в конце 1950-х и идеи глобального реформизма.

ГЛАВА 2. ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ ДЖ. КЕННЕДИ (1961–1963 гг.)



В конце президентства Дуайта Эйзенхауэра из-за ситуации, связанной с Кубинской революцией и уничтожением советской системой ПВО американского самолета – шпиона под Свердловском в 1960 г., вновь обострились отношения между США и СССР. Все это совпало с президентской избирательной кампанией 1962 г. Кандидат от Демократической партии, сенатор от штата Массачусетс Джон Кеннеди предложил программу «Новые рубежи», в которой были представлены новые подходы и стратегические идеи о новой роли США на международной арене.

Происходило переосмысление биполярного подхода в международных отношениях. Все больше внимания уделялось странам «третьего мира», которые стали играть заметную роль в мировой политике. США начинают учитывать их интересы и – с учетом новых тенденций и вызовов – берут на вооружение идеи глобального реформизма. По мнению Джона Кеннеди, именно эти идеи – в условиях мощных национально-освободительных движений и краха колониальных империй – могли затормозить распространение советского влияния. С учетом возникшего ядерного паритета между США и СССР, предлагались более гибкие военно-стратегические доктрины, дававшие возможность Вашингтону действовать более мобильно и эффективно. Впервые в послевоенное время допускалось осторожное ограничение гонки вооружений. Стремление американцев избежать ядерного конфликта, пойти по пути смягчения международной напряженности обеспечили победу на выборах Джону Кеннеди.

В данной главе представлены следующие документы:

1. John F. Kennedy Address to the United Nations General Assembly, (September 25, 1961).
2. James William Fulbright “For a Concert Of Free Nations,” (October 1961).
3. John F. Kennedy Address During the Cuban Missile Crisis, (October 22, 1962).
4. John F. Kennedy Commencement Address at American University, (June 10, 1963).
5. John F. Kennedy Televised Address on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, (June 11, 1963).

**John F. Kennedy: Address to the United Nations General Assembly,
25 September 1961**



25 сентября 1961 года Президент Кеннеди выступил с обращением к Генеральной Ассамблее ООН. Он представил своё видение по ряду вопросов – начиная с проблемы разоружения и полётов на Луну до проблем голода и загрязнения окружающей среды. В своем выступлении президент говорил об угрозе ядерной войны, которая зависла как «дамоклов меч» над каждым жителем планеты. Джон Кеннеди предложил амбициозный план всеобщего разоружения под международным контролем и заявил, что США будут продолжать поддерживать усилия ООН по поддержанию мира на планете.

В речи была дана оценка ситуации в Юго-Восточной Азии и конфликта, возникшего в связи с блокадой Западного Берлина. Особое внимание Джон Кеннеди уделил вопросам запрещения ядерного оружия и борьбы с колониальным наследием. Большинство стран-участников Генеральной Ассамблеи речь была воспринята как призыв к строительству нового, более безопасного и справедливого мира под эгидой обновленной ООН.

Mr. President, honored delegates, ladies and gentlemen:

We meet in an hour of grief and challenge. Dag Hammarskjold is dead. But the United Nations lives. His tragedy is deep in our hearts, but the task for which he died is at the top of our agenda. A noble servant of peace is gone. But the quest for peace lies before us.

I

The problem is not the death of one man-the problem is the life of this organization. It will either grow to meet the challenges of our age, or it will be gone with the wind, without influence, without force, without respect. Were we to let it die, to enfeeble its vigor, to cripple its powers, we would condemn our future.

For in the development of this organization rests the only true alternative to war-and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative. Unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer serve to settle disputes. It can no longer concern the great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water

and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war--or war will put an end to mankind. So let us here resolve that Dag Hammarskjold did not live, or die, in vain. Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.

II

This will require new strength and new roles for the United Nations. For disarmament without checks is but a shadow--and a community without law is but a shell. Already the United Nations has become both the measure and the vehicle of man's most generous impulses. Already it has provided--in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa this year in the Congo--a means of holding man's violence within bounds. But the great question which confronted this body in 1945 is still before us: whether man's cherished hopes for progress and peace are to be destroyed by terror and disruption, whether the "foul winds of war" can be tamed in time to free the cooling winds of reason, and whether the pledges of our Charter are to be fulfilled or defied--pledges to secure peace, progress, human rights and world law. In this Hall, there are not three forces, but two. One is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in Articles I and II of the Charter. The other, seeking a far different world, would undermine this organization in the process.

Today, of all days our dedication to the Charter must be maintained. It must be strengthened first of all by the selection of an outstanding civil servant to carry forward the responsibilities of the Secretary General--a man endowed with both the wisdom and the power to make meaningful the moral force of the world community. The late Secretary General nurtured and sharpened the United Nations' obligation to act. But he did not invent it. It was there in the Charter. It is still there in the Charter. However difficult it may be to fill Mr. Hammarskjold's place, it can better be filled by one man rather than three. Even the three horses of the Troika did not have three drivers, all going in different directions. They had only one--and so must the United Nations executive. To install a triumvirate, or any panel, or any rotating authority, in the United Nations administrative offices would replace order with anarchy, action with paralysis, confidence with confusion. The Secretary General, in a very real sense, is the servant of the General Assembly. Diminish his authority and you diminish the authority of the only body where all nations, regardless of power, are equal and sovereign. Until all the powerful are just, the weak will be secure only in the strength of this Assembly.

Effective and independent executive action is not the same question as balanced representation. In view of the enormous change in membership in this body since its founding, the American delegation will join in any effort for the prompt re-

view and revision of the composition of United Nations bodies. But to give this organization three drivers-to permit each great power to decide its own case, would entrench the Cold War in the headquarters of peace. Whatever advantages such a plan may hold out to my own country, as one of the great powers, we reject it. For we far prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war, in the age of mass extermination.

III

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us. Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons-ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth-is a source of horror, and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes-for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness – for in a spiraling arms race, a nation's security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase. For fifteen years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream-it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race.

It is in this spirit that the recent Belgrade Conference-recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet problem or an American problem, but a human problem-endorsed a program of "general, complete and strictly an internationally controlled disarmament." It is in this same spirit that we in the United States have labored this year, with a new urgency, and with a new, now statutory agency fully endorsed by the Congress, to find an approach to disarmament which would be so far-reaching, yet realistic, so mutually balanced and beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation. And it is in this spirit that we have presented with the agreement of the Soviet Union – under the label both nations now accept of "general and complete disarmament" – a new statement of newly-agreed principles for negotiation.

But we are well aware that all issues of principle are not settled, and that principles alone are not enough. It is therefore our intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race – to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We invite them now to go beyond agreement in principle to reach agreement on actual plans.

The program to be presented to this assembly – for general and complete disarmament under effective international control-moves to bridge the gap between

those who insist on a gradual approach and those who talk only of the final and total achievement. It would create machinery to keep the peace as it destroys the machinery of war. It would proceed through balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no state a military advantage over another. It would place the final responsibility for verification and control where it belongs, not with the big powers alone, not with one's adversary or one's self, but in an international organization within the framework of the United Nations. It would assure that indispensable condition of disarmament-true inspection-and apply it in stages proportionate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt their production as well as their testing, their transfer as well as their possession. It would achieve under the eyes of an international disarmament organization, a steady reduction in force, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations Peace Force. And it starts that process now, today, even as the talks begin. In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan, and a test-a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act. Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict and greed- but it would bring a world free from the terrors of mass destruction. It would not usher in the era of the super state-but it would usher in an era in which no state could annihilate or be annihilated by another. In 1945, this Nation proposed the Baruch Plan to internationalize the atom before other nations even possessed the bomb or demilitarized their troops. We proposed with our allies the Disarmament plan of 1951 while still at war in Korea. And we make our proposals today, while building up our defenses over Berlin, not because we are inconsistent or insincere or intimidated, but because we know the rights of free men will prevail-because while we are compelled against our will to rearm, we look confidently beyond Berlin to the kind of disarmed world we all prefer.

I therefore propose on the basis of this Plan, that disarmament negotiations resume promptly, and continue without interruption until an entire program for general and complete disarmament has not only been agreed but has actually been achieved.

IV

The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds, in every environment, under workable controls. The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed such a treaty that is both reasonable, effective and ready for signature. We are still prepared to sign that treaty today. We also proposed a mutual ban on atmospheric testing, without inspection or controls, in order to save the human race from the poison of radioactive fallout. We regret that the offer has not been accepted.

For 15 years we have sought to make the atom an instrument of peaceful growth rather than of war. But for 15 years our concessions have been matched by obstruction, our patience by intransigence. And the pleas of mankind for peace have met with disregard. Finally, as the explosions of others beclouded the skies, my country was left with no alternative but to act in the interests of its own and the free world's security. We cannot endanger that security by refraining from testing while others improve their arsenals. Nor can we endanger it by another long, uninspected ban on testing. For three years we accepted those risks in our open society while seeking agreement on inspection. But this year, while we were negotiating in good faith in Geneva, others were secretly preparing new experiments in destruction.

Our tests are not polluting the atmosphere. Our deterrent weapons are guarded against accidental explosion or use. Our doctors and scientists stand ready to help any nation measure and meet the hazards to health which inevitably result from the tests in the atmosphere. But to halt the spread of these terrible weapons, to halt the contamination of the air, to halt the spiralling nuclear arms race, we remain ready to seek new avenues of agreement, our new Disarmament Program thus includes the following proposals:

- First, signing the test-ban treaty by all nations. This can be done now. Test ban negotiations need not and should not await general disarmament.

- Second, stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and preventing their transfer to any nation now lacking in nuclear weapons.

- Third, prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not own them.

- Fourth, keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space.

- Fifth, gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and converting their materials to peaceful uses; and

- Finally, halting the unlimited testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and gradually destroying them as well.

V

To destroy arms, however, is not enough. We must create even as we destroy-creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons. In the world we seek, the United Nations Emergency Forces which have been hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and inadequately financed, will never be enough. Therefore, the United States recommends that all member nations earmark special peace-keeping units in their armed forces-to be on call of the United Nations, to be specially trained and quickly available, and with advanced provision for financial and logistic support. In addition, the American delegation will suggest a series of steps to improve the United Nations' machinery for the peaceful settlement of dis-

puts-for on-the-spot fact-finding, mediation and adjudication-for extending the rule of international law. For peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems-it is primarily a problem of politics and people.

And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control--and like the dinosaur vanish from the earth.

VI

As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man's new domain-outer space. All of us salute the brave cosmonauts of the Soviet Union. The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war. To this end, we shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration of the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation.

We shall propose further cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television. The day need not be far away when such a system will televise the proceedings of this body to every corner of the world for the benefit of peace.

VII

But the mysteries of outer space must not divert our eyes or our energies from the harsh realities that face our fellow men. Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope. That is why my nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960s as the United Nations Decade of Development. Under the framework of that Resolution, the United Nations' existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents of many. New research, technical assistance and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise- to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations.

VIII

My country favors a world of free and equal states. We agree with those who say that colonialism is a key issue in this Assembly. But let the full facts of that issue be discussed in full. On the one hand is the fact that, since the close of World War II,

a worldwide declaration of independence has transformed nearly 1 billion people and 9 million square miles into 42 free and independent states. Less than 2 percent of the world's population now lives in "dependent" territories. I do not ignore the remaining problems of traditional colonialism which still confront this body. Those problems will be solved, with patience, good will, and determination. Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my Country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer, in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support. But colonialism in its harshest forms is not only the exploitation of new nations by old, of dark skins by light, or the subjugation of the poor by the rich. My Nation was once a colony, and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class, their color.

And that is why there is no ignoring the fact that the tide of selfdetermination has not reached the Communist empire where a population far larger than that officially termed "dependent" lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions- under a system which knows only one party and one belief-which suppresses free debate, and free elections, and free newspapers, and free books, and free trade unions-and which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners. Let us debate colonialism in full-and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe.

IX

Finally, as President of the United States, I consider it my duty to report to this Assembly on two threats to the peace which are not on your crowded agenda, but which causes us and most of you, the deepest concern. The first threat on which I wish to report is widely misunderstood: the smoldering coals of war in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam is already under attack-sometimes by a single assassin, sometimes by a band of guerrillas, recently by full battalions. The peaceful borders of Burma, Cambodia, and India have been repeatedly violated. And the peaceful people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence they gained not so long ago.

No one can call these "wars of liberation." For these are free countries living under their own governments. Nor are these aggressions any less real because men are knifed in their homes and not shot in the fields of battle. The very simple question confronting the world community is whether measures can be devised to protect the small and the weak from such tactics. For if they are successful in Laos and South Viet-Nam, the gates will be opened wide. The United States seeks for itself, no base, no territory, no special position in this area of any kind. We support a truly neutral and independent Laos, its people free from outside interference, living at peace with

themselves and their neighbors, assured that their territory will not be used for attacks on others, and under a government comparable (as Mr. Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna) to Cambodia and Burma. But now the negotiations over Laos are reaching a crucial stage. The cease-fire is at best precarious. The rainy season is coming to an end. Laotian territory is being used to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. The world community must recognize-and all those who are involved-that this potent threat to Laotian peace and freedom is indivisible from all other threats to their own.

Secondly, I wish to report to you on the crisis over Germany and Berlin. This is not the time or the place for immoderate tones, but the world community is entitled to know the very simple issues as we see them. If there is a crisis it is because an existing peace is under threat, because an existing island of free people is under pressure, because solemn agreements are being treated with indifference. Established international rights are being threatened with unilateral usurpation. Peaceful circulation has been interrupted by barbed wire and concrete blocks.

One recalls the order of the Czar in Pushkin's "Boris Godunov:" "Take steps at this very hour that our frontiers be fenced in by barriers. ... That not a single soul pass o'er the border, that not a hare be able to run or a crow to fly." It is absurd to allege that we are threatening a war merely to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from signing a so-called "treaty" of peace. The Western Allies are not concerned with any paper arrangement the Soviets may wish to make with a regime of their own creation, on territory occupied by their own troops and governed by their own agents. No such action can affect either our rights or our responsibilities.

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin – and there is – it is because of threats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Western Powers, and the freedom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible. A "peace-treaty" which carried with it the provisions which destroy the peace would be a fraud. A "free city" which was not genuinely free would suffocate freedom and would be an infamy.

For a city or a people to be truly free they must have the secure right, without economic, political or police pressure, to make their own choice and to live their own lives. And as I have often said before, if anyone doubts the extent to which our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in all Berlin and, if possible, among all the German people.

The elementary fact about this crisis is that it is unnecessary. The elementary tools for a peaceful settlement are to be found in the charter. Under its law, agreements are to be kept, unless changed by all those who made them. Established rights are to be respected. The political disposition of peoples should rest upon their own wishes, freely expressed in plebiscites or free elections. If there are legal problems,

they can be solved by legal means. If there is a threat of force, it must be rejected. If there is desire for change, it must be a subject for negotiation, and if there is negotiation, it must be rooted in mutual respect and concern for the rights of others.

The Western Powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin and the self-determination of those citizens. This generation learned from bitter experience that either brandishing or yielding to threats can only lead to war. But firmness and reason can lead to the kind of peaceful solution in which my country profoundly believes. We are committed to no rigid formula. We see no perfect solution. We recognize that troops and tanks can, for a time, keep a nation divided against its will, however unwise that policy may seem to us. But we believe a peaceful agreement is possible which protects the freedom of West Berlin and allied presence and access, while recognizing the historic and legitimate interests of others in insuring European security. The possibilities of negotiation are now being explored; it is too early to report what the prospects may be. For our part, we would be glad to report at the appropriate time that a solution has been found. For there is no need for a crisis over Berlin, threatening the peace- and if those who created this crisis desire peace, there will be peace and freedom in Berlin.

X

The events and decisions of the next ten months may well decide the fate of man for the next ten thousand years. There will be no avoiding those events. There will be no appeal from these decisions. And we in this hall shall be remembered either as part of the generation that turned this planet into a flaming funeral pyre or the generation that met its vow "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." In the endeavor to meet that vow, I pledge you every effort this Nation possesses. I pledge you that we will neither commit nor provoke aggression, that we shall neither flee nor invoke the threat of force, that we shall never negotiate out of fear, we shall never fear to negotiate. Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example. But inevitably they fail, either because men are not afraid to die for a life worth living, or because the terrorists themselves came to realize that free men cannot be frightened by threats, and that aggression would meet its own response. And it is in the light of that history that every nation today should know, be he friend or foe, that the United States has both the will and the weapons to join free men in standing up to their responsibilities.

But I come here today to look across this world of threats to a world of peace. In that search we cannot expect any final triumph-for new problems will always arise. We cannot expect that all nations will adopt like systems--for conformity is the jailor of freedom, and the enemy of growth. Nor can we expect to reach our goal by con-

trivance, by fiat or even by the wishes of all. But however close we sometimes seem to that dark and final abyss, let no man of peace and freedom despair. For he does not stand alone. If we all can persevere, if we can in every land and office look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

Ladies and gentlemen of this Assembly, the decision is ours. Never have the nations of the world had so much to lose, or so much to gain. Together we shall save our planet, or together we shall perish in its flames. Save it we can-and save it we must-and then shall we earn the eternal thanks of mankind and, as peacemakers, the eternal blessing of God.

Вопросы:

- Почему, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, обострилась проблема «ядерной катастрофы, и какова в этой связи должна быть роль ООН?
- Какую угрозу несет, по мнению Джона Кеннеди, тот факт, что в Совете Безопасности ООН каждая из трех (фактически, двух) мировых держав действует исключительно в своих интересах?
- Почему, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, «сегодня над головой каждого мужчины, женщины и ребенка навис Ядерный Дамоклов меч»?
- Каков, по мнению президента, должен быть механизм по разрушению машины войны?
- Почему, по мнению Джона Кеннеди, необходимо запретить испытания ядерного оружия?
- Перечислите шесть пунктов «Программы по разоружению», с которой выступил президент Джон Кеннеди.
- Что, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, необходимо дополнительно включить в Хартию ООН?
- Что, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, представляет из себя борьба с современным колониализмом?
- Какую характеристику Джон Кеннеди дает ситуации в Юго-Восточной Азии и в чем видит причины лаосского кризиса?
- Как президент Джон Кеннеди видит пути разрешения берлинского кризиса?
- С каким призывом выступил Джон Кеннеди в конце своей речи на заседании Ассамблеи ООН?


Темы презентаций:

- Преемственность и изменения – новое в тактике и стиле внешнеполитического поведения администрации Джона Кеннеди.
- Программа «Союз ради прогресса» как реализация идей нового мирового порядка.
- Доктрина «Гибкого реагирования» («регулируемая эскалация» конфликта) 1961.
- Стратегия Рауэна.
- Концепция «второго удара» (в нач. 1960-х). Концепция «ограничения ущерба». Концепция «двух с половиной войн» (до нач. 1970-х).
- Лаосский кризис и Новые Женевские соглашения 1962 г. о нейтрализации и мире в Лаосе.

Темы рефератов:

- Европейские направление внешней политики США в начале 1960-х гг. «Великий проект» (атлантическое сообщество).
- «О новой внешнеторговой программе» – янв. 1962.
- «План Норстера» и идея «ядерного товарищества».
- Стратегия «перехвата». Концепция «Сбалансированного подхода США к проблемам Ближнего Востока».
- США и Южный Вьетнам. Контрпартизанский план.

James William Fulbright “For a Concert Of Free Nations,” (October 1961)



Во многом как продолжение и как академическое обоснование речи Джона Кеннеди на Генеральной Ассамблее, стала статья известного американского сенатора Джеймса Уильяма Фулбрайта, опубликованная в авторитетном журнале «Форин Аффэйрс (Foreign Affairs)» в октябре 1961 г. под названием «За со-

гласованные действия (концерт) свободных народов» (“For a Concert Of Free Nations”). В своей работе, опираясь на исторический опыт, автор предлагает свое видение сотрудничества «свободных народов», вспоминая опыт Европы 19 в., и в частности, решения Венского Конгресса 1815 г. Отмечая слабый уровень единства «свободных народов» на современном этапе США, по примеру Великобритании в XIX в. Основная идея данной статьи, имевшей, сенатор предложил усилить ценностный подход и признать лидирующую роль большой резонанс среди либеральных политиков и интеллектуалов, заключалась в том, что невозможно обеспечить систему коллективной безопасности в мире без очень тесных и согласованных действий «свободных народов» под руководством США и без реформирования международных институтов.

I

THE Soviet Union has demanded that the United Nations be reorganized on the "troika" principle, with equal executive power given the West, the Communist bloc and the neutral states. Each would wield a veto. This proposal quite clearly aims to emasculate the United Nations and in particular reduce the office of the Secretary-General to the same impotence which blights the functioning of the Security Council.

In this situation it has been suggested that a general conference of U.N. members be called to review and possibly revise the Charter. I believe that a review conference at this time would be an exercise in futility. Quite obviously, the Western powers – and, hopefully, many of the neutrals – will reject the Soviet scheme. And the Russians can hardly be expected to agree to any Western proposals for strengthening the organization when their own objective is diametrically opposed to this.

Whatever inadequacies there may be in the U.N. Charter, the problem is not basically a legal matter but one of power politics in a divided world. Instead of engaging in an arid and irrelevant exercise in legalities, we would be far better advised to seek feasible means of building a cohesive community of free nations.

This objective should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations. In large measure, however, it must be pressed outside of the U.N., through instrumentalities that reflect a limited but real community of common interests. Despite the existence of a very imposing array of international organs of consultation and cooperation, the free nations of the world seem chronically unable to unify and coordinate their policies. They are at the same time confronted with an adversary who has repeatedly demonstrated an impressive capacity to mobilize diverse resources for the achievement of single-minded objectives. The question quite naturally arises whether some new machinery or system can be devised through which the free nations can advance their common interests with a far greater degree of coordinated effort and shared responsibility than has yet been achieved in the postwar era.

We have created extensive international machinery since World War II – the United Nations, a global system of alliances and, most recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Despite the existence of these and other organs, the United States continues to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of world responsibility – a burden, I fear, which overtaxes even our own considerable resources. Throughout the world, both allied and uncommitted nations display a distressing tendency to stand aside, even when their own vital interests are involved, and leave it to the United States to act while reserving for themselves the right to criticize or to condemn. A psychology of aloofness has taken hold in much of the free world. Even in Britain the illusion has become widespread, although not in official circles, that somehow the United Kingdom can be neutral in a world-wide power struggle in which only the United States and the Soviet Union have vital interests at stake.

France has lessened her military participation in NATO and taken other steps which gravely impair the effectiveness of the alliance. Germany adheres loyally to NATO, but refuses to accept an obligation commensurate with her wealth and resources to carry out the common Western responsibility for assisting the world's underdeveloped nations. India, the largest free nation of Asia, acts as though the expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia is a problem outside her own interests, in which she can act at most as a disinterested "honest broker."

The psychology of aloofness can be readily understood in terms of a profound feeling of impotence on the part of oncedominant nations which have lost both empire and preeminence, and also on the part of new nations beset with overwhelming internal problems. It is all too easy for such nations to despair of their own ability to influence the course of events and to leave the arena to the giants. In the case of Western Europe this sense of impotence is as unfounded as it is regrettable. Together the nations of Western Europe surpass the Soviet Union in population, in productivity and perhaps as well in the human skills that are essential to modern industrial societies. Their impotence, in short, is largely selfimposed, a function of disunity and inadequate will to mobilize the full weight of their impressive resources.

The trouble with this psychology of aloofness is that it both underestimates the power of the nations who succumb to it and overestimates the power of the United States, and in so doing exerts a very definite and detrimental influence on events. The fact is that the United States alone has neither the power, the resources nor the will to bear unaided the crushing burden of world responsibility. It is largely trying to do so now, and, as anyone can testify who has followed recent events in Laos, in Cuba or in Geneva, it is not doing well at all. In the past, the free nations of the world have performed impressive tasks of coordinating their efforts and mobilizing their joint resources in the face of grave external threats. They did so in both world wars and again in the early years of the cold war.

Over the past decade, however, their efforts have flagged, while the external danger is more grave than ever from a powerful and skillful adversary whose successes have been stunning and whose ambitions are unlimited. In the face of this danger, the course of both reason and necessity for *all* of the free nations is to accept a fair share of the responsibility for the defense of their common interests. The question is how and whether a dynamic "concert of free nations" can be put together. It is clear that the United Nations, although it was designed to form just such a concert, has fallen far short of the hopes which attended its creation; we must look elsewhere for a system that can unify the forces of freedom effectively.

The dilemma of any effort to create an organic unity among nations or even a loose comity is that there is no necessary correlation between human need and human capacity. The need for a new "concert of nations" is very clear: it derives from the formidable threat of aggressive imperialistic Communism. The capacity to build such a concert requires something more than the negative spur of fear and common danger; it requires the positive force of a sense of *community*, which means a feeling and deep conviction of shared values and interests, a feeling that effective communication is possible, a feeling of trust and confidence in each other's purpose.

It is precisely because no such community is within reach on a world-wide scale that even the United Nations, to say nothing of proposals for world federation, goes far beyond our capacity in its aspirations, however defective it may be in terms of our needs. Indeed the great paradox of this century is that the divisive force of nationalism appears to have reached its historical peak at precisely the time when developments in science and military technology have unified the world in the physical sense and established the need for political units far beyond existing national frontiers.

It is thus imperative that we strive for a broader unity, a unity which is oriented to our needs but rooted in our capacity. While the United Nations will remain a symbol of our aspirations, we can hope at the most, as things stand, to build a viable community of the free world. The question is whether we have yet done all that we can to develop it. Although such a community must for the foreseeable future be limited to the free nations, it can set its sights on universal values.

II

Prescriptions for the future, if they are to prove effective, must be rooted in the experience of the past. It is more than an academic exercise, therefore, to look back in history for models and examples of a viable spirit of international community. Such a spirit prevailed in remarkable measure in nineteenth century Europe. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe developed a primitive but effective system of public law based on the treaty structure erected by the Congress of Vienna. In order to provide permanent security against a resurgence of French militarism and ag-

gression, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia formed in 1815 a quadruple alliance of which Article 6 provided for "periodic meetings of sovereigns or their ministers" for preserving the peace and stability of Europe. France, the defeated aggressor, was granted remarkably generous terms and within three years of her defeat was brought into the system of consultation. Thus emerged the Concert of Europe, an oligarchy of great powers, but none the less a genuine community of nations who identified their common interests in preserving a rough balance of power and the basic integrity of the treaty structure.

The Vienna settlement opened a century of relative peace. The guiding rule of the Concert, never made explicit but none the less effective, was that no change in the treaty structure could be made without the consent of the five-power oligarchy. Thus, for example, with "due process of law," the Concert decreed the independence of Belgium in 1830, a definite regime for the Turkish straits in 1840, the independence of Bulgaria in 1878, and, as late as 1913, the Concert successfully imposed a settlement of the Balkan wars.

The role of Britain in the Concert of Europe is especially instructive. As the leading financial, industrial and naval power, Britain accepted special responsibilities for the enforcement of the public law of Europe. She initiated something of a Marshall Plan after 1815, providing loans and subsidies to revive the war-torn economies of the European powers. Britain was the "holder" of the balance of power and her weight was thrown when necessary to the support of the weaker side in continental controversies and against the potential violator of treaties. When forcible changes in treaty requirements were unavoidable, as in the case of Russia's denunciation in 1871 of the naval restrictions imposed upon her in the Black Sea at the end of the Crimean War, Britain insisted upon a conference to put the stamp of legality on a foregone conclusion and thus to avoid a dangerous precedent.

The point which is most instructive for America in our own time is that Britain led but did not dominate the Concert. She was not the mistress of Europe but its *primus inter pares*. Her role, in short, was not to exercise sole responsibility but to lead a system of shared responsibility. The *Pax Britannica* was thus a multilateral system which depended at least as much on its members as on its leader. The Concert of Europe represented a limited community and a fragile system of law, but it kept the peace for a hundred years—a splendid achievement by contrast with the far more structured and sophisticated international machinery of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, the Concert had major flaws, and these ultimately proved fatal. It was first of all an oligarchy of great powers which imposed its will on the lesser states with little regard for their desires and aspirations. Secondly, the Concert at times showed little understanding of the rising forces of democracy and nationalism in nineteenth century Europe. Indeed, the eastern powers – Austria, Russia and Prussia – were quite hostile to these forces and sought in vain to use the Concert as an instrument to suppress them and to "make Europe safe for autocracy."

Thirdly, the absence of established machinery of obligatory consultation reduced the workings of the Concert to hazardous uncertainty. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, tried desperately and vainly to invoke the Concert in the crisis of the summer of 1914. The chaos of telegrams frantically exchanged among the chancelleries of Europe at that time persuaded Grey that, if the Concert of Europe had had some established machinery of obligatory consultation, war might have been prevented. The most serious handicap to the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe, however, proved to be the disintegration of the international community of shared values on which it rested. During the first half of the nineteenth century, nationalist movements were also liberal and democratic and Europe was increasingly dedicated to the rule of law. This trend was arrested and then reversed by the rise of a new form of nationalism—militant, aggressive and ultimately xenophobic. The prime mover of the new nationalism was Germany, whose unification and preeminence were won by the arms of autocratic Prussia. After the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871, Germany became the predominant nation in Europe, dedicated to Bismarckian "blood and iron."

Europe in the late nineteenth century was prey to militarism, secret alliances and nationalist rivalries. The demise of the Concert of Europe in 1914 reflected the gradual enfeeblement and final disintegration of the community which had given Europe its happiest and most productive century. Out of the ruins of the old European order, British and American statesmen devised the League of Nations – a radically new idea for the creation of a world-wide community of law. The British conceived of the League of Nations as an enlarged and improved Concert, but Woodrow Wilson thought of it as a universalized application of the Monroe Doctrine, which he regarded as a partnership of American states for the advancement of democracy in world affairs. British thinking was empirical in terms of European experience, a latter-day effort to bring in the new world to redress the balance of the old. Wilson's conception was universal and idealist, generalizing the Monroe Doctrine as he conceived it into a world moral order. These two views were not mutually exclusive. The British hoped to revive a community that had disintegrated; the Americans hoped to build a new one.

Both looked to their own deeply rooted traditions of ordered society under the rule of law. The chief British contribution to the Covenant was a system of obligatory consultation, peaceful settlement of disputes, and sanctions against violators. The objective, inspired largely by the disastrous experience of 1914, was to enforce delay and an attempt at peaceful settlement before nations actually resorted to war. The major American contribution was Article 10, a mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity among the members of the League. Article 10, said President Wilson, was the "backbone of the whole of the Covenant." It represented the

guarantee which is the *sine qua non* of any valid system of collective security, an obligation inherent in membership, flowing directly from the Covenant, and not dependent upon the decisions of any organ of the League.

The founders of the League believed that it reflected the birth of a new world order and that its very processes would guide a nascent community to full maturity. Wilson had no illusions as to the existence at that time of a genuine international community, but he firmly believed that the historical moment had arrived for such a community to be born. The League, said Wilson in presenting the Covenant to the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, would depend ultimately on the "moral force of the public opinion of the world." "Armed force," said the President, "is in the background in this program, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort..."

The year 1919 was perhaps the high-water mark of democracy in world history. The victory was won by democratic nations, unshared with great totalitarian powers. It marked the occurrence of an epochal opportunity to lay the foundations of a world community of law – not to create a community full-grown, for that is the work of generations, but to give birth to a prospect of world peace under world law. The opportunity so briefly presented in 1919 was lost, and lost completely, by the generation of statesmen who governed during the interwar years. It is not necessary here to rehearse the tragic annals of that era – the retreat of America to isolation, the capitulation of the League to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Italian aggression in Ethiopia and German aggression in Europe. The result was World War II, more devastating than the first war.

By 1945 the statesmen of the West were ready to retrieve the errors of the interwar years. They had the will perhaps, but the opportunity of 1919 was not to be repeated. The victory of 1945 was shared by a dynamic new totalitarianism, one which rejected the values which underlay both the nineteenth century Concert and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

III

Under these conditions the United Nations was conceived and created, an organ of international community far more ambitious than the League and launched under far less auspicious circumstances. There is no mystery in the failure of the United Nations to fulfill its promise. That promise rested on the assumption that President Roosevelt brought back from Yalta in February 1945 – that we had achieved unity "in spirit and in purpose" with our allies. Events proved that hope illusory and with it went the promise of a genuine system of collective security on a world-wide scale. There are at least three preconditions of a viable system of collective security: (1) a status quo on which the principal powers agree; (2) the availability of overwhelming force to those nations who support the status quo or at least oppose

change by violence; (3) a high degree of political and moral solidarity among the great powers. These are the minimum conditions of a minimum international community. None of them existed at the end of World War II. The success of the United Nations depended upon the presence of all of them.

The United Nations' Charter reflects the ambivalence of excessive aspirations toward a world community and the existence in the world of conflicting powers and ideologies. In the words of the distinguished international lawyer, Julius Stone: "The very ambition of the Charter turned it into a two-faced instrument. One face looks nobly towards the beginnings of a super-State well beyond the League of Nations; the other looks grimly backwards to the anarchic self-help of the old world, well before the foundation of the League of Nations. Which was the real face?" The answer, unfortunately, is the "second face." The global community which the Charter assumed exists today neither in fact nor in prospect. If the social fabric essential to institutions does not exist, even the most brilliant statecraft cannot create it.

The "first face" of the Charter appears in the peace enforcement powers of the Security Council, an organ vested with full authority to apply all sanctions, including the use of force, against any nation which commits a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." The Security Council has the theoretical power to decide on such measures and all members of the United Nations are bound under Article 25 to "accept and carry out" these decisions. The veto reduces these powers to a nullity because it renders the great powers immune, leaving the enforcement of the peace to their fiat. The Charter was never intended for use against the great powers. They were the policemen, set above the law, whose compliance with the Charter depended not on law but on their own consent, and on the illusion of their unity "in spirit and in purpose." The history of the United Nations has been in large measure a history of retreat from false hopes and of adjustment to the reality of a divided world. The veto in fact is an accurate reflection of that reality. Its removal would not result in a genuine system of collective security. More likely it would mean the end of the organization. The veto is the reflection, not a cause, of conflict.

In its absence, a great power would not comply with the Charter but would rebel against it. The real problem is one not of legalities but of power politics in a divided world. The veto represents the "second face" of the Charter; it is a clause of escape and evasion. So does Article 51, which recognizes an "inherent" right of individual and collective self-defense. As Western statesmen have repeatedly pointed out, their system of defense alliances is wholly valid under the Charter, clearly licensed by Article 51. But NATO is an essential instrument of collective security precisely because of the failure of the U.N. It is not a realization of the Charter but a substitute for it authorized by a clause of escape and reservation. The primitive parts of the Charter, those which look to anarchic self-help, have proven viable because they re-

flect reality. The grand innovation of an authoritative international executive quickly broke down because it defied history and falsely assumed the existence of a community of the great powers.

The gradual transfer of authority from the Security Council to the General Assembly has been an effort to adjust to reality by retreating to looser and more traditional forms of cooperation. Such was the intent of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 1950. The Security Council has all but ceased to function and it was the General Assembly which dealt more or less successfully with the Suez crisis of 1956 and quite unsuccessfully with the Soviet suppression of Hungary. The difficulty with the General Assembly is that it is a most unwieldy body and one which bears no relationship to the realities of world power. A body in which Guatemala or Bulgaria exercises the same voting power as the United States or the Soviet Union can scarcely be expected to serve as a reliable instrument of peace enforcement or even of consultation. The anarchic face of the U.N. dominates. Its forward-looking face is but a shadow and a promise. It seems quite clear that if we are to develop a working concert of free nations, we must look elsewhere for a model and an instrumentality.

IV

By far the most impressive achievements of policy coordination among sovereign powers have occurred in wartime. In both world wars the Western powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, achieved a high degree of cooperation along specific functional lines in the common war effort. During the First World War the Allied and Associated Powers dealt through international agencies with such problems as the coordination of military strategy, the allocation of shipping and the maintenance of supplies of food and raw materials. The Supreme War Council, for instance, under Marshal Foch, was virtually an international cabinet for the conduct of the war. Before the war was over, some European statesmen began to think of it as a "rudimentary league of nations." A number of other functional international organs operated with great success during the war and the Peace Conference.

Impressive achievements of close coordination, indeed unification, of policy were achieved by Great Britain and the United States in World War II. The grand strategy of the war was planned in constant and intimate consultations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and the British and American armed forces were put under a joint command known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Under the direction of the political leaders of the two countries, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, sitting in Washington, formulated and executed policies and plans relating to the strategic conduct of the war, allocation of munitions and transportation requirements. A close working relationship developed between the top British representative.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill, and General George Marshall, who together made major policy decisions in an informal manner. The Allied war effort was also unified by a system of combined boards whose task was to muster the full economic resources of Great Britain and the United States and Canada. The combined boards as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff were created and carried on in an atmosphere in which the common purpose of defeating the enemy overrode all other motives. Survival itself depended upon common effort and a united front. National and group interests were readily subordinated by the two English-speaking nations with their common interests, their similar outlook and their community of democratic values. Underlying the ability of British and American officials to work closely together was a sense of community derived from long association and a common heritage. It is significant that at no point was the Soviet Union brought into the system of unified conduct of the war.

The experience of the joint war effort points to the efficacy of a functional approach toward the building of an international community. Common efforts to deal with specific concrete problems are likely to be more productive in the long run than comprehensive and spectacular attempts at world constitution-making. In times of clear and present danger, custom, inertia, vested interests and traditional viewpoints give way to the needs of the times. The problem that now confronts us is whether they will give way in a time of ominous danger, but danger which is vague, ambiguous and lacking in dramatic urgency. That is the nature of the peril which confronts the free world. Unless we can forge something like the unity of purpose and common action that we so successfully forged in wartime, we may well fall victim if not to cataclysm then to creeping catastrophe.

V

In a speech on June 10, 1961, to a rally of Young Conservatives, Sir Anthony Eden called for a "political general staff" of Western leaders to enable free countries to stand up to "the monolithic mass which is the Communist world." In a pessimistic assessment of the cold war, Eden declared: "There must be much closer unity within the West before there can be effective negotiation with the East." Ordinary methods of diplomacy within the free world are inadequate, said the former Prime Minister. "Something much more thorough is required." Citing the experience of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Eden said that all would have been confusion and disarray without them. "This," he said, "is exactly what has been happening between the politically free nations in the postwar world. We need joint chiefs of a political general staff." Citing the advances of Communist power in recent years. Sir Anthony observed: "This very grave state of affairs will continue until the free nations accept together the reality of the danger that confronts them and unite their policies and resources to meet it."

While I fully agree with Sir Anthony's contention, I think that we must carry the analysis farther, bearing in mind that while common peril may be the measure of our *need*, the existence or absence of a positive sense of community must be the measure of our *capacity*. While it is hazardous to project the trend of history, it seems clear that a genuine community is painfully emerging in the Western world, particularly among the countries of Western Europe. At the end of World War II, free Europe was ready for a new beginning. The excesses of nationalism had brought down upon Europe a generation of tyranny and war, and a return to the old order of things seemed unthinkable. Under these conditions a new generation of Europeans began to discover the bonds of long association and shared values that for so long had been subordinated to nationalist xenophobia. A slow and painful trend toward unification has taken hold, a trend which may at any time be arrested and reversed but which may also lead to a binding federation of Europe. It may well be that the unification of Europe will prove inadequate, that the survival of free society will require nothing less than the confederation of the entire Western world.

The movement toward European unity has been expressed in two currents: federalism and functionalism, one looking to the constitution of a United States of Europe, the other building on wartime precedents of practical cooperation for the solution of specific problems. Thus far the advances made have been almost entirely along functional lines. Many factors contributed to the growth of the European movement. In 1946 Sir Winston Churchill, who had spoken often of European union during the war, advocated the formation of "a kind of United States of Europe." Had Churchill been returned to office in 1945, it is just possible that Britain, instead of standing fearfully aloof, would have *led* Europe toward union.

In 1947 and 1948 the necessity of massive coordinated efforts to achieve economic recovery led to the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to supervise and coordinate the uses of American aid under the Marshall Plan. The United States might well have exploited the opportunity provided by the European Recovery Program to push the hesitant European nations toward political federation as well as economic cooperation, but all proposals to this effect were rejected by the United States Government at the time. Another powerful factor in the European movement was the threat of Soviet aggression. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was followed immediately by the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty, a 50-year alliance among Britain, France and the Benelux countries. And of course the Soviet threat was responsible for NATO, the grand alliance of the Atlantic nations.

New organs of unification proliferated in the decade following the conclusion of the NATO alliance. In 1949 the Council of Europe came into existence, a purely consultative parliamentary body but the first organ of political rather than functional

unity. In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community was launched, placing the coal and steel production of France, West Germany, Italy and Benelux under a supranational High Authority. For a time it appeared that a common European army might be created, but the project for a European Defense Community was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. In 1957 the social-economic approach to European integration was capped by the formation among "the Six" of a tariff-free European Common Market, and Euratom for cooperation in the development of atomic energy.

The "overseas" democracies have generally encouraged the European unification movement without seriously considering the wisdom of their own full participation in a broader Atlantic community. The United States and Canada belong only to NATO and the new O.E.C.D. Britain until recently went along in some areas with all of the enthusiasm of the groom at a shotgun wedding. In other areas it held back, pleading its Commonwealth bonds. Now Britain has decided to seek admission to the European Economic Community and it seems certain that she will be joined by some of her partners in the loose Free Trade Area of the "Outer Seven." Besides its historical significance as a break with the centuries-old tradition of British insularity, Britain's move, if successful, will constitute an historic landmark of the first importance in the movement toward the unification of Europe and the Western world.

If a broader Atlantic community is to be formed – and my own judgment is that it lies within the realm of both our needs and our capacity – a ready nucleus of machinery is at hand in the NATO alliance. The time is now ripe, indeed overdue, for the vigorous development of its non-military potentialities, for its development as an instrument of Atlantic community what is required is the full implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty, which provides: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any and all of them." As Lester Pearson wrote in 1955: "NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being."

The problem of NATO is not one of machinery, of which there is an abundance, but of the will to use it. The NATO Council is available as an executive agency, the Standing Group as a high military authority. The unofficial Conference of Parliamentarians is available as a potential legislative authority. This machinery will not become the instrument of an Atlantic community by fiat, but only when that community evolves from potentiality to reality. The existence of a community is a state of mind – a conviction that goals and values are widely shared, that effective

communication is possible, that mutual trust is reasonably assured. An equally promising avenue toward Atlantic community may lie through the development and expansion of the O.E.C.D. Conceived as an organ of economic cooperation, there is no reason why O.E.C.D. cannot evolve into a broader instrument of union if its members so desire. Indeed it might be a more appropriate vehicle than NATO for the development of a parliamentary organ of the Atlantic nations, because it could encompass *all* of the members of the Atlantic community including those, like Sweden and Switzerland, who are unwilling to be associated with an essentially military alliance like NATO.

Underlying these hopes and prescriptions is a conviction that the nations of the North Atlantic area do indeed form a community, at least a potential community. There is nothing new in this; what is new and compelling is that the West is now but one of several powerful civilizations, or "systems," and that one or more of the others may pose a mortal danger to the West. For centuries the North Atlantic nations dominated the world and as long as they did they could afford the luxury of fighting each other. That time is now past and the Atlantic nations, if they are to survive, must develop a full-fledged community, and they must also look beyond the frontiers of "Western civilization" toward a world-wide "concert of free nations."

VI

The burden of these reflections is that a broader unity among the free nations is at the core of our needs. And if we do not aspire to too much, it is also within our capacity. A realistic balancing of the need for new forms of international organization on the one hand, and our capacity to achieve them on the other, must be approached through the concept of "community." History has demonstrated many times that concerts of nations based solely on the negative spur of common danger are unlikely to survive when the external danger ceases to be dramatically urgent. Only when a concert of nations rests on the positive foundations of shared goals and values is it likely to form a viable instrument of long-range policy. It follows that the solution to the current disunity of the free nations is only to a very limited extent a matter of devising new machinery of consultation and coordination. It is very much a matter of building the foundations of community.

It is for these reasons that proposals for a "new world order," through radical overhaul of the United Nations or through some sort of world federation, are utterly fatuous. In a recent book called "World Peace Through World Law," two distinguished lawyers, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, call for just such an overhaul of the U.N., basing their case on the world-wide fear of a nuclear holocaust. I believe that these proposals, however meritorious in terms of world needs, go far beyond our capacity to realize them. Such proposals look to an apocalyptic act, a kind of Lockian "social contract" on a world-wide scale. The defect of these proposals is in their at-

tempt to outrun history and their assumption that because something may be desirable it is also possible.

A working concept of the organic evolution of community must lead us in a different direction. The failures of the U.N. and of other international organs suggest that we have already gone beyond what was internationally feasible. Our problem, therefore,

is to devise processes more modest in their aspirations, adjusted to the real world of sovereign nation states and diverse and hostile communities. The history of the U.N. demonstrates that in a pluralistic world we must develop processes of influence and persuasion rather than coercion. It is possible that international organization will ultimately supplant the multi-state system, but its proper function for the immediate future is to reform and supplement that system in order to render pluralism more compatible with an interdependent world.

New machinery of coordination should not be our primary objective in the foreseeable future – though perhaps the "political general staff" of Western leaders proposed by Sir Anthony Eden would serve a useful purpose. Generally, however, there is an abundance of available machinery of coordination – in NATO, in O.E.C.D., in the U.N. and elsewhere. The trouble with this machinery is that it is not used and the reason that it is not used is the absence of a conscious sense of community among the free nations. Our proper objective, then, is the development of a new spirit, the realization of a potential community. A "concert of free nations" should take its inspiration from the traditions of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe with its common values and accepted "rules of the game." Constitutions of and by themselves mean little; the history of both the League of Nations and the United Nations demonstrates that. But a powerful sense of community, even with little or no machinery, means a great deal.

That is the lesson of the nineteenth century. A realistic "concert of free nations" might be expected to consist of an "inner community" of the North Atlantic nations and an "outer community" embracing much or all of the non-Communist world. The North Atlantic nations represent an almost-existing community and, because they do, they can press forward in the development of supranational institutions. Because their community is fragile, these institutions for the time being should be functional rather than federal, piecemeal and pragmatic rather than general. In practice, this would mean the further development of NATO as an organ of political and economic cooperation, the vigorous implementation of the O.E.C.D., and the expansion of existing organs of European integration, with Great Britain, Canada and the United States moving toward full participation.

The "outer community" poses much more difficult problems, because it is a *potential* community still far from realization. Our objective must be to bring it into ex-

istence, a task which will take time and patience. The problem here is to persuade the new and underdeveloped nations that for certain purposes at least their interests and objectives coincide with our own. Their aspirations for economic development, for military security and for freedom are all objectives which represent our interests as well as their own. The way to persuade these nations of this community of interests is for the West to assist them in their realization. In practice, this means a unified Western program of economic assistance for sound development programs, rigorous respect for the sovereignty of newly independent nations, and a growing practice of consulting these nations on specific common problems. Such a policy also means the encouragement of a greater sense of responsibility among the underdeveloped nations than now exists. If their economic development programs are unsound, we must not be "blackmailed" into providing lavish aid for fear they will otherwise go to the Communists. When we consult them on matters of security, we must make it clear that their security as well as our own is involved and they must accept responsibility accordingly. In all these ways we can work toward a "concert of free nations," a community rooted not only in common peril but also in common values and aspirations. Such a community falls far short of the stable *world* order we desire. Its merit is that it represents a realistic accommodation between our needs and our capacity.

Freedom is not its own defense. Its survival in this century will require the construction of a new community of unified effort and shared responsibility. In the words of the Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga: "The trouble today is that the Communist world understands unity but not liberty, while the free world understands liberty but not unity. Eventual victory may be won by the first of the two sides to achieve the synthesis of both liberty and unity."

Вопросы:

- Как сенатор У. Фулбрайт объясняет слабость Западной Европы перед лицом Советского блока?
- Почему на повестке дня, по мнению сенатора, встал вопрос о создании динамичного «концерта (тесного союза) свободных наций»? Что должно лежать в основе такого объединения?
- Какую роль, по мнению сенатора, для объединения «свободных наций» должны играть универсальные ценности?
- Что из опыта Венского конгресса 1815 г., по мнению сенатора, можно взять на вооружение при создании союза (концерта) свободных наций?
- Какую роль («первая среди равных»), по мнению У. Фулбрайта, сыграла Великобритания в европейских делах в 19 в.?
- Чем отличались британские и американские цели при создании Лиги Наций?

- Какие, по мнению сенатора, должны были быть принципиальные условия, чтобы после Второй мировой войны возникла устойчивая система коллективной безопасности?
- Почему сенатор сравнивает «великие нации» с полицейским, который выше закона?
- Почему, по мнению сенатора, для того, чтобы международное сообщество было эффективным, необходимо сформировать новую модель отношений в рамках ООН?
- Какую роль, по мнению сенатора, сыграл Уинстон Черчилль в вопросе послевоенной европейской интеграции?
- Почему, по мнению сенатора, при создании «концерта наций» необходимо опираться на общие цели и ценности?
- Какой смысл вкладывает сенатор в понятие «великое чувство общности» (a powerful sense of community)?
- Почему, по мнению сенатора, свободный мир не демонстрирует единство?

Темы презентаций:

- Политические взгляды сенатора Фулбрайта.
- Дискуссии среди ученых и политиков о реформировании ООН.
- Новые тенденции в международных отношениях в начале 1960-х гг.
- Ценностный подход в вопросе консолидации и объединении «свободных наций».

Темы рефератов:

- Борьба СССР и США за влияние в странах «третьего мира».
- Крах колониальных империй и политика США в отношении национально-освободительных движений.
- Политическая мысль в США в сфере международных отношений.

John F. Kennedy Address During the Cuban Missile Crisis, (October 22, 1962)



Как известно, одним из самых кризисных и опасных событий в период администрации Джона Кеннеди стал Карибский кризис 1962 г. В своем знаменитом телевизионном обращении к нации 22 октября 1962 г. (John F. Kennedy Address During the Cuban Missile Crisis, (October 22, 1962)). президент охарактеризовал размещение на Кубе советских ракет, способных нести ядерные боеголовки как экзистенциальную угрозу его стране и потребовал их ликвидации. Было объявлено о «семи шагах», которые предпринял Джон Кеннеди в ответ на советскую угрозу и обратился к кубинскому народу с призывом повлиять на свое правительство, чтобы не допустить войны между двумя народами. Анализ данного обращения позволяет понять, насколько далеко готовы были пойти США, чтобы не допустить размещение советских ракет у своих границ.

Good evening my fellow citizens: This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet Military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail. The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washing-

ton, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles--capable of traveling more than twice as far--and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared. This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--by the presence of these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction--constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11, and I quote, "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," that, and I quote the Soviet Government, "there is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons ... for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote their government, "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false. Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nucle-

ar weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which ensured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history--unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II – demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the Bull's-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines. In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger--although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles-in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy--this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil--is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required – and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth – but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately.

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6, rejected secrecy in such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned in continuing this threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements – and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction-by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cu-

ba – by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis – and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum-in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful – without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides-including the possibility of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union-for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples. But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat-or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week-must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed-including in particular the brave people of West Berlin--will be met by whatever action is needed.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed – and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas-and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war-the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny your freedom.

Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free-free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this hemisphere.

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can see precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead--months in which our patience and our will will be tested--months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are--but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high--and Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right--not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved. Thank you and good night.

Вопросы:

- С какой целью, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, размещаются на Кубе советские ракетные установки?
- На каком основании Джон Кеннеди утверждает, что заявления советского правительства по поводу размещения ракет на Кубе являются ложью?
- Почему Джон Кеннеди считает, что размещение ракет на Кубе является угрозой не только для США, но и для стран Латинской Америки?
- Что, по мнению президента, говорит человечеству опыт 1930-х годов в Европе и Азии?
- Какие «семь шагов» были предприняты президентом Джоном Кеннеди в ответ на размещение советских ракет на Кубе?
- С каким призывом обратился президент Джон Кеннеди к кубинскому народу?

Темы презентаций:

- Вторжение на Кубу в заливе Кочинос на Пляя-Хирон 17 апреля 1961.
- Советско-кубинское сотрудничество.
- Политический портрет Фиделя Кастро.
- Операция «Анадырь».
- Решения конференции в Пунта-дель-Эста в январе 1962 г.
- Реакция стран Латинской Америки на Кубинскую революцию.

Темы рефератов:

- Этапы и итоги Карибского кризиса 1962 г.
- Отношения между СССР и США в период Карибского кризиса.
- Реакция стран НАТО на действия СССР и США в период Карибского кризиса.
- Долгосрочные последствия Карибского кризиса для системы международных отношений.
- Ведущие политические мыслители и известные ученые о природе Карибского кризиса.

John F. Kennedy Commencement Address at American University (June 10, 1963)



Во многом реакцией на Карибский кризис, когда мир стоял на грани ядерной катастрофы, стала речь президента Джона Кеннеди на выпускной церемонии в Американском университете в Вашингтоне 10 июля 1963 г. (John F. Kennedy Commencement Address at American University, (June 10, 1963)). Элиты двух стран, испытав стресс, стали стремиться стабилизировать советско-американские отношений, не допустить повторение событий, подобных Карибскому кризису. В своей речи президент заявил, что в современной ядерной войне не будет победителя, поэтому она потеряла всякий смысл. Также было сказано, что у США и СССР могут быть общие интересы, что может стать основой для сотрудничества в будущем. Были озвучены и еще ряд идей и предложений, нацеленных на смягчение международной напряженности. Такой поворот во внешней политике США заложил основу для «малой разрядки» и важных соглашений между СССР и США в 1970-е гг.

Эта речь Кеннеди известна также под названием «Стратегия мира» (A Strategy of Peace). Советник президента Кеннеди [Тед Соренсен](#) назвал это выступление лучшей речью Кеннеди. Интересный факт – выступление Кеннеди в Вашингтоне настолько понравилось руководителю СССР [Никите Хрущёву](#), что по его указанию газеты «[Правда](#)» и «[Известия](#)» опубликовали полный русский перевод этой речи.

President Anderson, members of the faculty, board of trustees, distinguished guests, my old colleague, Senator Bob Byrd, who has earned his degree through many years of attending night law school, while I am earning mine in the next 30 minutes, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: It is with great pride that I participate in this ceremony of the American University, sponsored by the Methodist Church, founded by Bishop John Fletcher Hurst, and first opened by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914. This is a young and growing university, but it has already fulfilled Bishop Hurst's enlightened hope for the study of history and public affairs in a city devoted to the making of history and the conduct of the public's business. By sponsoring this institution of higher learning for all who wish to learn, whatever their color or their creed, the Methodists of this area and the Nation deserve the Nation's thanks, and I commend all those who are today graduating.

Professor Woodrow Wilson once said that every man sent out from a university should be a man of his nation as well as a man of his time, and I am confident that the men and women who carry the honor of graduating from this institution will continue to give from their lives, from their talents, a high measure of public service and public support. "There are few earthly things more beautiful than a university," wrote John Masefield in his tribute to English universities-and his words are equally true today. He did not refer to spires and towers, to campus greens and ivied walls. He admired the splendid beauty of the university, he said, because it was "a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see." I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived-yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children-not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women--not merely peace in our time but peace for all time. I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear

forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles-which can only destroy and never create-is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war-and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament-and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude-as individuals and as a Nation-for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward-by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.

First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable-that mankind is doomed-that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade-therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable-and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal. Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace- based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions-on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace-no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process-a way of solving problems.

With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor-it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors. So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.

Second: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on Military Strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims-such as the allegation that "American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of wars ... that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union ... [and that] the political aims of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries ... [and] to achieve world domination ... by means of aggressive wars."

Truly, as it was written long ago: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements-to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning-a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats. No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements-in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including nearly two thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland-a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again-no matter how-our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many nations, including this Nation's closest allies-our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counter -weapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours-and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest. So, let us not be blind to our differences-but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Third: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different. We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy-or of a collective death-wish for the world. To secure these ends, America's weapons are no provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tension without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not

need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people-but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth. Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system-a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished. At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East, and in the Indian sub-continent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others-by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and in Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. Those alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge. Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope – and the purpose of allied policies – to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The Communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that, if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured. This will require a new effort to achieve world law-a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communication. One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis. We have also been talking in Geneva about the other first-step measures of arms control designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and to reduce the risks of accidental war. Our primary long range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament- designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this

Government since the 1920's. It has been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And however dim the prospects may be today, we intend to continue this effort-to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are.

The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security-it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard.

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history--but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude toward peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives – as many of you who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home. But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because the freedom is incomplete. It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government-local, State, and National-to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures tell us, "he make the even his enemies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights-the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation-the right to breathe air as nature provided it – the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can-if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers-offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough-more than enough-of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on-not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

Вопросы:

- Какой смысл вложил президент Джон Кеннеди в понимание мирного сосуществования?
- Что говорит президент об угрозе ядерной войны?
- Что подразумевается под постепенной эволюцией в человеческих институтах (on a gradual evolution in human institutions)?
- Почему президент Джон Кеннеди призывает пересмотреть отношение к Советскому Союзу?
- Что общего, по мнению президента, между двумя нациями – американской и советской?
- Что имеет в виду президент Джон Кеннеди, призывая пересмотреть отношение к Холодной войне?
- Каковы, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, должны быть отношения с союзниками с учетом новых подходов к СССР?
- Какое обязательство взяли на себя США по вопросу испытаний ядерного оружия?
- Какие аргументы использовал президент Джон Кеннеди, заявляя, что США никогда не начнут войну первыми?

Темы презентаций:

- Изменения во внешней политике США как результат Карибского кризиса.
- Ядерный паритет между США и СССР как фактор, способствующий движению в сторону разрядки.
- Сравнительный анализ ядерного потенциала СССР и США в начале 1960-х гг.
- Оценка результатов Карибского кризиса президентом Кеннеди и Н.С. Хрущевым.
- Реакция союзников США на речь президента. Дискуссия между сторонниками и противниками новых предложений и оценок президента.

Темы рефератов:

- Реалистическая тенденция во внешней политике США.
- «Концепция конвергенции» или надежда на эрозию институтов социалистических стран.
- Политика «дифференцированного подхода» в отношении стран Восточной Европы.
- Влияние внутривнутриполитических факторов на формирование новых приоритетов во внешней политике США.
- Влияние достижений СССР в области науки и техники на внешнюю политику США.

John F. Kennedy Televised Address on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (June 11, 1963)



Конкретным шагом по реализации нового подхода в отношениях с СССР стала инициатива Джона Кеннеди по запрещению ядерных испытаний в атмосфере. В своем обращении к нации (John F. Kennedy Televised Address on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, (June 11, 1963) президент дал четкое обоснование важности подписания данного договора. В своем телевизионном обращении к нации он особо подчеркнул, что это будет являться реальным шагом по пути разрядки

и смягчения международной напряженности. В результате, в августе 1963 г. в Москве был подписан договор о запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия в трех средах между США, СССР и Великобританией. Это был первый договор по ограничению стратегических вооружений, и тем самым был дан импульс двигаться по пути сотрудничества в сфере ограничения и контроля ядерного оружия.

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

In these years, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington and in Moscow; in Geneva and at the United Nations. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord, or disillusion. Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control—a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.

That plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This Nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water, for such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no onsite inspection, no international body. We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right of self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty

mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war. Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign it, from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.

For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this Nation from testing underground, or from being ready to conduct atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require, it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests. This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear—most recently in Berlin and Cuba—our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race. In three administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962.

But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side—it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing. This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step—a step towards peace—a step towards reason—a step away from war.

Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children and your neighbors.

First, this treaty can be a step towards reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any nonaggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require. No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol-if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another-if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration-then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace. Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead towards that end-but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.

I do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent. But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling arms race and a collision course towards war. Since the beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a half I have been required to report to you as President that this Nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation-in Laos, in Berlin, and in Cuba.

A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "the survivors would envy the dead." For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

Second, this treaty can be a step towards freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such fallout to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe. Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard –

and it is not a statistical issue. The loss of even one human life, or the malformation of even one baby—who may be born long after we are gone—should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.

Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today. I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation, all four nuclear powers have a great obligation, to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons.

This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign, for it is in the interest of all nations, and already we have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our Nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.

We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred megaton bomb of which they spoke a years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, that hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violations, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequences for the violator.

Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing, if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost, and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interests for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are small, the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the

risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war.

This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this Nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate.

It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must be not left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours. If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show all the world on this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for complacency.

We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be deterred.

The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are all still there, in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved, and that our strength and unity were no longer required. But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin.

According to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step.

Thank you and good night.

Вопросы:

- В каких трех средах, по заявлению президента Джона Кеннеди, будет прекращено испытание ядерного оружия?
- При каких условиях, сторона подписавшая договор, может из него выйти?
- При подписании договора, какие цели, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, преследуются?
- Символом чего, по мнению президента, становится подписание данного договора?
- Какие четыре основных аргумента приводит президент в пользу подписания Договора?
- В каком контексте Джон Кеннеди цитирует слова Н.С. Хрущева, что «живые позавидуют мертвым»?
- Какая, по мнению президента Джона Кеннеди, существует связь между данным Договором и политикой разоружения?
- Почему президент Джон Кеннеди в своем выступлении приводит китайскую поговорку «путь в тысячу миль начинается с первого шага»?

Темы презентаций:

- «Договор о запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия в атмосфере, в космическом пространстве и под водой» (Московский договор) 1963 г. Содержание, цели, процесс подписания.
- История испытания ядерного оружия до подписания договора.
- Дискуссия среди экспертов по вопросу подписания договора.
- Реакция политического сообщества и рядовых граждан внутри США на подписание Договора.

Темы рефератов:

- Ядерный потенциал Франции на 1963 г. Почему Франция не подписала Московский договор?
- Ядерный потенциал Великобритании к моменту подписания договора.
- Ядерный потенциал СССР к моменту подписания договора.
- Ядерный потенциал США к моменту подписания договора.
- Проблема термоядерного оружия.
- Термоядерное оружие СССР. Испытание «Царь-бомбы» 30 октября 1961 года.

Глава 3. ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ Л. ДЖОНСОНА (1963–1969 гг.)



После трагической смерти 35 президента США, новым президентом становится вице-президент Линдон Джонсон. Во внешней политике США происходят сначала малозаметные, а затем масштабные изменения, характеризующиеся сдвигом в сторону политики глобального интервенционизма. Наиболее ярким проявлением такой политики стала агрессия США во Вьетнаме (1964–1973 гг.). Мирные инициативы президента Джона Кеннеди «были положены под сукно» или полностью дезавуированы, а во внешней политике усиливаются элементы авантюризма. Вашингтон предпринял акции «давления» на СССР, прервал контакты с руководством СССР, вновь посыпались угрозы в отношении Кубы, укрепились контакты с диктаторскими режимами Латинской Америки и расистскими режимами Африки. Национально-освободительные движения в странах «третьего мира» стали оцениваться как экспансия Москвы. Все заметнее стало стремление США усилить политику, нацеленную на утверждение глобального лидерства. В основе такой политики лежали идеи мессианства, агрессивного антикоммунизма, убежденности во «всемогуществе» США.

Одним из ключевых элементов внешней политики становится укрепление атлантической солидарности на основе новой ядерной стратегии, что привело к созданию вместе с союзниками по НАТО Комитета по ядерному планированию. Деятельность Комитета должна была привлечь союзников к коллективной разработке ядерной стратегии Запада. В отношении социалистического блока проводилась политика «наведения мостов», чтобы через развития отношений с рядом стран Восточной Европы способствовать их разобщению и росту национализма и сепаратизма. В мае 1965 г. была провозглашена «доктрина Джонсона» для Латинской Америки, которая декларировала право США на военное вмешательство в любую латиноамериканскую страну, если Вашингтон посчитает, что есть угроза прихода к власти коммунистов.

В данной главе представлены следующие документы:

1. Lyndon B. Johnson: Message to Congress, August 1964.
2. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 August 7, 1964.
3. Lyndon B. Johnson: "Peace Without Conquest," April 1965.
4. Lyndon B. Johnson: Annual Message to Congress, January 1966.

Lyndon B. Johnson: Message to Congress (August 1964)



Кульминацией агрессивной, интервенционистской политики администрации Линдона Джонсона стала Война во Вьетнаме. Уже через четыре дня после убийства Джон Кеннеди, новый президент издал директиву (26.11.1963), в которой был представлен план авиаударов по ДРВ и Лаосу с целью разгрома коммунистов в Южном Вьетнаме. В феврале 1964 г. был принят «Оперативный план 34А» – программа тайных диверсионных операций против Северного Вьетнама. Программа включала высадку на Севере диверсионных групп для осуществления саботажа, минирования стратегических объектов, похищение граждан с целью получения важной информации. Одним из пунктов программы стало патрулирование американских ВМС у берегов Северного Вьетнама. В начале августа 1964 г. было принято решение начать открытую войну США против ДРВ. Чтобы спровоцировать противника, американский эсминец «Мэддокс» 2 августа вошел в территориальные воды Северного Вьетнама, в районе Тонкинского залива, где был атакован сторожевыми катерами ДРВ.

В Вашингтоне это было воспринято как объявление войны, президент обратился с посланием к Конгрессу (*Lyndon B. Johnson: Message to Congress, August 1964*) и в итоге 7 августа была принята «Тонкинская резолюция» (*Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 August 7, 1964.*), фактически объявившая войну ДРВ. Резолюция давала право президенту использовать вооруженные силы в регионе Юго-Восточной Азии. Лишь два сенатора проголосовали против. Президент Джонсон 10 августа подписал «тонкинскую резолюцию», которая приобрела силу закона. В ней говорилось, что Конгресс поддерживает «все необходимые меры для отражения любого вооруженного нападения против военных сил США и предотвращения дальнейшей агрессии».

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action. After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states. Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations – all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening...

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such at-

tacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom. As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos...

**Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145
August 7, 1964**



Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Вопросы:

- Что послужило поводом для президента Линдона Джонсона просить Конгресс принять совместную резолюцию по защите мира в Юго-Восточной Азии?
- Почему президент апеллирует к Договору о коллективной безопасности в Юго-Восточной Азии 1954 г.?
- На какие положения договора, дающие США право вмешаться в ситуацию в данном регионе, указывает президент Линдон Джонсон?
- Какие, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, Северо-вьетнамский режим сознательно нарушает положения Женевские соглашения 1962 г.?
- Какие полномочия предоставляются президенту Линдону Джонсону Тонкинской резолюцией?
- На какие документы опираются конгрессмены при принятии Тонкинской резолюции?
- При какой ситуации прекращается действие данной резолюции?

Темы презентаций:

- События в Тонкинском заливе 2 и 4 августа 1964 г.
- Сдвиг в сторону глобального интервенционизма во внешней политике США после гибели Джона Кеннеди.
- США и проекты мирового лидерства.
- Политический портрет и взгляды Роберта Макнамары.
- Доктрина Т. Манна.

Темы рефератов:

- Изменения в политике США в Юго-Восточной Азии после прихода к власти Л. Джонсона.
- Внутриполитическая борьба во Вьетнаме накануне американского военного вмешательства в 1964 г.
- Борьба народа Вьетнама за независимость в послевоенный период. Образование двух вьетнамских государств.
- Политический строй и внешняя политика Северного Вьетнама во второй половине 1950-х – начале 1960-х гг.
- «Тайная война» США против стран Юго-Восточной Азии в начале 1960-х гг.

Lyndon B. Johnson: “Peace Without Conquest” (April 1965)



Далеко не все в США позитивно восприняли начавшиеся военные действия США во Вьетнаме. Многие простые американцы не понимали, за что должны умирать их соотечественники в далекой стране за тысячу километров от границ США. Попыткой объяснить участие в войне и первые потери, которые понесли американцы, стало выступление Линдона Джонсона в Университете Хопкинса в апреле 1965 г. Его речь, названная «Мир без завоеваний» (*Lyndon B. Johnson: “Peace Without Conquest,” April 1965.* была нацелена на то, чтобы обосновать в глазах простых людей участие страны в кровавом гражданском конфликте государства, о котором большинство граждан ничего не знали. По мнению Линдона Джонсона, налицо вмешательство в конфликт Китая с целью нарушить мировой баланс сил. В речи звучат предложения по урегулированию конфликта и заявляется о готовности предоставить масштабную экономическую помощь народу Южного Вьетнама.

Mr. Garland, Senator Brewster, Senator Tydings, Members of the congressional delegation, members of the faculty of Johns Hopkins, student body, my fellow Americans.

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world. I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace.

We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place. The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest.

Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war-and all Asia-is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam? We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence. And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in southeast Asia-as we did in Europe--in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile-that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves-only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam-and all who seek to share their conquest-of a very simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge. Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam-securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others-free from outside interference-tied to no alliance-a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle-Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the work of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works. Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area. As far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office, and his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and the existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care.

Schools can be established to train people in the skills that are needed to manage the process of development.

And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn, rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

In areas that are still ripped by conflict, of course development will not be easy. Peace will be necessary for final success. But we cannot and must not wait for peace to begin this job.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change-as we see in our own country now-does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful; or because we have made some mistakes; or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam-of China and India-of Russia and America-are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge-always before denied-to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity

came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside--yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These-not mighty arms-are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive. And, if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes-and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we could? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale never dreamed of before. Well, we will choose life. In so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and this great institution, Johns Hopkins, I thank you for this opportunity to convey my thoughts to you and to the American people.

Good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in Shriver Hall Auditorium at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. In his opening words, he referred to Charles S. Garland, Chairman of the University's Board of Trustees, and Senators Daniel B. Brewster and Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland.

Later he referred to Dr. Milton Eisenhower, President of Johns Hopkins University, and Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank and adviser to the President on southeast Asia social and economic development.

Вопросы:

- Как президент Линдон Джонсон отвечает на поставленные им вопрос – почему американцы должны сражаться и умирать за тысячи километров от территории США?

- В чем, по словам президента Линдона Джонсона, особенности войны во Вьетнаме?

- Почему в связи с войной во Вьетнаме, президент Линдон Джонсон упоминает коммунистический Китай?
- Почему, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, война во Вьетнаме – это попытка нарушить мировой баланс сил?
- Как президент Линдон Джонсон формулирует цель США во вьетнамской войне?
- Как, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, должно выглядеть мирное соглашение?
- Что, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, в первую очередь «должны сделать США сегодня», в свете все нарастающего конфликта?
- В каком размере и для каких целей президент Линдон Джонсон предлагает экономическую помощь народу Южного Вьетнама?
- Какие вопросы президент Линдон Джонсон задает сам себе перед тем, «как ночью выключает свет, чтобы заснуть»?
- Какая дилемма, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, стоит перед людьми всего мира?

Темы презентаций:

- Оперативный план 34А. Содержание, декларируемые цели.
- Ход военных действий в 1964–1966 гг. Расширение американского участия.
- Реакция союзников США на начало полномасштабного военного вмешательства США в войну во Вьетнаме.
- «Доктрина Л. Джонсона для Латинской Америки». Содержание, цели, реализация.
- Реакция в США и мире на события в деревне Сонгми (Южный Вьетнам, 16 марта 1968 г.). Формирование «вьетнамского синдрома».
- Дефолиация и использование химического оружия («эйджит орэндж»). Масштабы, последствия, реакция общественности.

Темы рефератов:

- США и расистские режимы в Африке. Формы сотрудничества.
- США и реализация «Доктрины Джонсона» на примере ситуации в Панаме, Бразилии и на Кубе.
- Военное вмешательство США в дела Доминиканской республики в 1965 г.
- США и национально-освободительные движения в середине 1960-х гг. «Периферийная стратегия».
- «Азиатская доктрина» Л. Джонсона.
- Реакция стран Латинской Америки на участие США в войне во Вьетнаме. Декларация американских президентов.

Lyndon B. Johnson: Annual Message to Congress (January 1966)



В середине 1960-х, перед администрацией Линдона Джонсона встал вопрос – способны ли США одновременно реализовывать программу с амбициозным названием «Великое общество», нацеленную на создание целой сети социальных программ и институтов, и при этом вести очень затратную войну во Вьетнаме?

Своего рода ответом на этот вопрос стало ежегодное обращение президента к Конгрессу в январе 1966 г. (*Lyndon B. Johnson: Annual Message to Congress, January 1966*). В своей речи Линдон Джонсон заверил конгрессменов и весь американский народ в том, что в условиях экономического роста США успешно реализуют программу «борьбы с бедностью» и добьются «справедливого» мира во Вьетнаме. Президент обозначил пять основных принципов, лежащих в основе внешней политики, опираясь на которые США обязательно добьются поставленных целей в Индокитае.

Сталкиваясь с возрастающей критикой своей агрессивной внешней политики, Линдон Джонсон в своем выступлении пытался представить себя в качестве миротворца, объявив о временном прекращении бомбардировок Северного Вьетнама. Было сделано заявление, что он всегда готов к мирным переговорам. Прозвучали и призывы улучшить отношения со странами Восточной Европы. Реализовывалась во многом типичная для США политика «кнута и пряника».

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the House and the Senate, my fellow Americans:

I come before you tonight to report on the State of the Union for the third time.

I come here to thank you and to add my tribute, once more, to the Nation's gratitude for this, the 89th Congress. This Congress has already reserved for itself an honored chapter in the history of America.

Our Nation tonight is engaged in a brutal and bitter conflict in Vietnam. Later on I want to discuss that struggle in some detail with you. It just must be the center of our concerns.

But we will not permit those who fire upon us in Vietnam to win a victory over the desires and the intentions of all the American people. This Nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough, to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society here at home.

And that is what I have come here to ask of you tonight.

I recommend that you provide the resources to carry forward, with full vigor, the great health and education programs that you enacted into law last year.

I recommend that we prosecute with vigor and determination our war on poverty.

I recommend that you give a new and daring direction to our foreign aid program, designed to make a maximum attack on hunger and disease and ignorance in those countries that are determined to help themselves, and to help those nations that are trying to control population growth.

I recommend that you make it possible to expand trade between the United States and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

I recommend to you a program to rebuild completely, on a scale never before attempted, entire central and slum areas of several of our cities in America.

I recommend that you attack the wasteful and degrading poisoning of our rivers, and, as the cornerstone of this effort, clean completely entire large river basins.

I recommend that you meet the growing menace of crime in the streets by building up law enforcement and by revitalizing the entire Federal system from prevention to probation.

I recommend that you take additional steps to insure equal justice to all of our people by effectively enforcing nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection, by making it a serious Federal crime to obstruct public and private efforts to secure civil rights, and by outlawing discrimination in the sale and rental of housing.

I recommend that you help me modernize and streamline the Federal Government by creating a new Cabinet level Department of Transportation and reorganizing several existing agencies. In turn, I will restructure our civil service in the top grades so that men and women can easily be assigned to jobs where they are most needed, and ability will be both required as well as rewarded.

I will ask you to make it possible for Members of the House of Representatives to work more effectively in the service of the Nation through a constitutional amendment extending the term of a Congressman to 4 years, concurrent with that of the President.

Because of Vietnam we cannot do all that we should, or all that we would like to do. We will ruthlessly attack waste and inefficiency. We will make sure that every

dollar is spent with the thrift and with the commonsense which recognizes how hard the taxpayer worked in order to earn it.

We will continue to meet the needs of our people by continuing to develop the Great Society.

Last year alone the wealth that we produced increased \$47 billion, and it will soar again this year to a total over \$720 billion.

Because our economic policies have produced rising revenues, if you approve every program that I recommend tonight, our total budget deficit will be one of the lowest in many years. It will be only \$1.8 billion next year. Total spending in the administrative budget will be \$112.8 billion. Revenues next year will be \$111 billion.

On a cash basis-which is the way that you and I keep our family budget-the Federal budget next year will actually show a surplus. That is to say, if we include all the money that your Government will take in and all the money that your Government will spend, your Government next year will collect one-half billion dollars more than it will spend in the year 1967.

I have not come here tonight to ask for pleasant luxuries or for idle pleasures. I have come here to recommend that you, the representatives of the richest Nation on earth, you, the elected servants of a people who live in abundance unmatched on this globe, you bring the most urgent decencies of life to all of your fellow Americans.

There are men who cry out: We must sacrifice. Well, let us rather ask them: Who will they sacrifice? Are they going to sacrifice the children who seek the learning, or the sick who need medical care, or the families who dwell in squalor now brightened by the hope of home? Will they sacrifice opportunity for the distressed, the beauty of our land, the hope of our poor?

Time may require further sacrifices. And if it does, then we will make them. But we will not heed those who wring it from the hopes of the unfortunate here in a land of plenty.

I believe that we can continue the Great Society while we fight in Vietnam. But if there are some who do not believe this, then, in the name of justice, let them call for the contribution of those who live in the fullness of our blessing, rather than try to strip it from the hands of those that are most in need.

And let no one think that the unfortunate and the oppressed of this land sit stifled and alone in their hope tonight. Hundreds of their servants and their protectors sit before me tonight here in this great Chamber.

The Great Society leads us along three roads-growth and justice and liberation.

[1.] First is growth--the national prosperity which supports the well-being of our people and which provides the tools of our progress.

I can report to you tonight what you have seen for yourselves already – in every city and countryside. This Nation is flourishing.

Workers are making more money than ever – with after-tax income in the past 5 years up 33 percent; in the last year alone, up 8 percent.

More people are working than ever before in our history – an increase last year of 2 1/2 million jobs.

Corporations have greater after-tax earnings than ever in history. For the past 5 years those earnings have been up over 65 percent, and last year alone they had a rise of 20 percent.

Average farm income is higher than ever. Over the past 5 years it is up 40 percent, and over the past year it is up 22 percent alone.

I was informed this afternoon by the distinguished Secretary of the Treasury that his preliminary estimates indicate that our balance of payments deficit has been reduced from \$2.8 billion in 1964 to \$1.3 billion, or less, in 1965. This achievement has been made possible by the patriotic voluntary cooperation of businessmen and bankers working with your Government.

We must now work together with increased urgency to wipe out this balance of payments deficit altogether in the next year.

And as our economy surges toward new heights we must increase our vigilance against the inflation which raises the cost of living and which lowers the savings of every family in this land. It is essential, to prevent inflation, that we ask both labor and business to exercise price and wage restraint, and I do so again tonight.

I believe it desirable, because of increased military expenditures, that you temporarily restore the automobile and certain telephone excise tax reductions made effective only 12 days ago. Without raising taxes-or even increasing the total tax bill paid--we should move to improve our withholding system so that Americans can more realistically pay as they go, speed up the collection of corporate taxes, and make other necessary simplifications of the tax structure at an early date.

I hope these measures will be adequate. But if the necessities of Vietnam require it, I will not hesitate to return to the Congress for additional appropriations, or additional revenues if they are needed.

[2.] The second road is justice. Justice means a man's hope should not be limited by the color of his skin.

I propose legislation to establish unavoidable requirements for nondiscriminatory jury selection in Federal and State courts – and to give the Attorney General the power necessary to enforce those requirements.

I propose legislation to strengthen authority of Federal courts to try those who murder, attack, or intimidate either civil rights workers or others exercising their constitutional rights – and to increase penalties to a level equal to the nature of the crime.

Legislation, resting on the fullest constitutional authority of the Federal Government, to prohibit racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.

For that other nation within a Nation-the poor-whose distress has now captured the conscience of America, I will ask the Congress not only to continue, but to speed up the war on poverty. And in so doing, we will provide the added energy of achievement with the increased efficiency of experience.

To improve the life of our rural Americans and our farm population, we will plan for the future through the establishment of several new Community Development Districts, improved education through the use of Teacher Corps teams, better health measures, physical examinations, and adequate and available medical resources.

For those who labor, I propose to improve unemployment insurance, to expand minimum wage benefits, and by the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act to make the labor laws in all our States equal to the laws of the 31 States which do not have tonight right-to-work measures.

And I also intend to ask the Congress to consider measures which, without improperly invading State and local authority, will enable us effectively to deal with strikes which threaten irreparable damage to the national interest.

[3.] The third path is the path of liberation. It is to use our success for the fulfillment of our lives. A great nation is one which breeds a great people. A great people flower not from wealth and power, but from a society which spurs them to the fullness of their genius. That alone is a Great Society.

Yet, slowly, painfully, on the edge of victory, has come the knowledge that shared prosperity is not enough. In the midst of abundance modern man walks oppressed by forces which menace and confine the quality of his life, and which individual abundance alone will not overcome.

We can subdue and we can master these forces-bring increased meaning to our lives-if all of us, Government and citizens, are bold enough to change old ways, daring enough to assault new dangers, and if the dream is dear enough to call forth the limitless capacities of this great people.

This year we must continue to improve the quality of American life.

Let us fulfill and improve the great health and education programs of last year, extending special opportunities to those who risk their lives in our Armed Forces.

I urge the House of Representatives to complete action on three programs already passed by the Senate-the Teacher Corps, rent assistance, and home rule for the District of Columbia.

In some of our urban areas we must help rebuild entire sections and neighborhoods containing, in some cases, as many as 100,000 people. Working together, private enterprise and government must press forward with the task of providing homes and shops, parks and hospitals, and all the other necessary parts of a flourishing community where our people can come to live the good life.

I will offer other proposals to stimulate and to reward planning for the growth of entire metropolitan areas.

Of all the reckless devastations of our national heritage, none is really more shameful than the continued poisoning of our rivers and our air.

We must undertake a cooperative effort to end pollution in several river basins, making additional funds available to help draw the plans and construct the plants that are necessary to make the waters of our entire river systems clean, and make them a source of pleasure and beauty for all of our people.

To attack and to overcome growing crime and lawlessness, I think we must have a stepped-up program to help modernize and strengthen our local police forces.

Our people have a right to feel secure in their homes and on their streets – and that right just must be secured.

Nor can we fail to arrest the destruction of life and property on our highways.

I will propose a Highway Safety Act of 1966 to seek an end to this mounting tragedy.

We must also act to prevent the deception of the American consumer – requiring all packages to state clearly and truthfully their contents – all interest and credit charges to be fully revealed-and keeping harmful drugs and cosmetics away from our stores.

It is the genius of our Constitution that under its shelter of enduring institutions and rooted principles there is ample room for the rich fertility of American political invention.

We must change to master change.

I propose to take steps to modernize and streamline the executive branch, to modernize the relations between city and State and Nation.

A new Department of Transportation is needed to bring together our transportation activities. The present structure-35 Government agencies, spending \$5 billion yearly-makes it almost impossible to serve either the growing demands of this great Nation or the needs of the industry, or the right of the taxpayer to full efficiency and real frugality.

I will propose in addition a program to construct and to flight-test a new supersonic transport airplane that will fly three times the speed of sound-in excess of 2,000 miles per hour.

I propose to examine our Federal system-the relation between city, State, Nation, and the citizens themselves. We need a commission of the most distinguished scholars and men of public affairs to do this job. I will ask them to move on to develop a creative federalism to best use the wonderful diversity of our institutions and our people to solve the problems and to fulfill the dreams of the American people.

As the process of election becomes more complex and more costly, we must make it possible for those without personal wealth to enter public life without being obligated to a few large contributors.

Therefore, I will submit legislation to revise the present unrealistic restriction on contributions-to prohibit the endless proliferation of committees, bringing local and State committees under the act-to attach strong teeth and severe penalties to the requirement of full disclosure of contributions – and to broaden the participation of the people, through added tax incentives, to stimulate small contributions to the party and to the candidate of their choice.

To strengthen the work of Congress I strongly urge an amendment to provide a 4-year term for Members of the House of Representatives, which should not begin before 1972.

The present 2-year term requires most Members of Congress to divert enormous energies to an almost constant process of campaigning-depriving this Nation of the fullest measure of both their skill and their wisdom. Today, too, the work of government is far more complex than in our early years, requiring more time to learn and more time to master the technical tasks of legislating. And a longer term will serve to attract more men of the highest quality to political life. The Nation, the principle of democracy, and, I think, each congressional district, will all be better served by a 4-year term for Members of the House. And I urge your swift action.

Tonight the cup of peril is full in Vietnam.

That conflict is not an isolated episode, but another great event in the policy that we have followed with strong consistency since World War II.

The touchstone of that policy is the interest of the United States – the welfare and the freedom of the people of the United States. But nations sink when they see that interest only through a narrow glass.

In a world that has grown small and dangerous, pursuit of narrow aims could bring decay and even disaster.

An America that is mighty beyond description-yet living in a hostile or despairing-world would be neither safe nor free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man.

In this pursuit we helped rebuild Western Europe. We gave our aid to Greece and Turkey, and we defended the freedom of Berlin.

In this pursuit we have helped new nations toward independence. We have extended the helping hand of the Peace Corps and carried forward the largest program of economic assistance in the world.

And in this pursuit we work to build a hemisphere of democracy and of social justice.

In this pursuit we have defended against Communist aggression – in Korea under President Truman – in the Formosa Straits under President Eisenhower – in Cuba under President Kennedy – and again in Vietnam.

Tonight Vietnam must hold the center of our attention, but across the world problems and opportunities crowd in on the American Nation. I will discuss them fully in the months to come, and I will follow the five continuing lines of policy that America has followed under its last four Presidents.

[1.] The first principle is strength. Tonight I can tell you that we are strong enough to keep all of our commitments. We will need expenditures of \$58.3 billion for the next fiscal year to maintain this necessary defense might.

While special Vietnam expenditures for the next fiscal year are estimated to increase by \$5.8 billion, I can tell you that all the other expenditures put together in the entire Federal budget will rise this coming year by only \$.6 billion. This is true because of the stringent cost-conscious economy program inaugurated in the Defense Department, and followed by the other departments of Government.

[2.] A second principle of policy is the effort to control, and to reduce, and to ultimately eliminate the modern engines of destruction. We will vigorously pursue existing proposals--and seek new ones--to control arms and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

[3.] A third major principle of our foreign policy is to help build those associations of nations which reflect the opportunities and the necessities of the modern world. By strengthening the common defense, by stimulating world commerce, by meeting new hopes, these associations serve the cause of a flourishing world.

We will take new steps this year to help strengthen the Alliance for Progress, the unity of Europe, the community of the Atlantic, the regional organizations of developing continents, and that supreme association--the United Nations. We will work to strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce barriers to trade, and to improve international finance.

[4.] A fourth enduring strand of policy has been to help improve the life of man.

From the Marshall plan to this very moment tonight, that policy has rested on the claims of compassion, and the certain knowledge that only a people advancing in expectation will build secure and peaceful lands.

This year I propose major new directions in our program of foreign assistance to help those countries who will help themselves. We will conduct a worldwide attack on the problems of hunger and disease and ignorance.

We will place the matchless skill and the resources of our own great America, in farming and in fertilizers, at the service of those countries committed to develop a modern agriculture.

We will aid those who educate the young in other lands, and we will give children in other continents the same head start that we are trying to give our own children. To advance these ends I will propose the International Education Act of 1966.

I will also propose the International Health Act of 1966 to strike at disease by a new effort to bring modern skills and knowledge to the uncared-for, those suffering in the world, and by trying to wipe out smallpox and malaria and control yellow fever over most of the world during this next decade; to help countries trying to control population growth, by increasing our research – and we will earmark funds to help their efforts.

In the next year, from our foreign aid sources, we propose to dedicate \$1 billion to these efforts, and we call on all who have the means to join us in this work in the world.

[5.] The fifth and most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence – the right of each people to govern themselves – and to shape their own institutions.

For a peaceful world order will be possible only when each country walks the way that it has chosen to walk for itself.

We follow this principle by encouraging the end of colonial rule.

We follow this principle, abroad as well as at home, by continued hostility to the rule of the many by the few-or the oppression of one race by another.

We follow this principle by building bridges to Eastern Europe. And I will ask the Congress for authority to remove the special tariff restrictions which are a barrier to increasing trade between the East and the West.

The insistent urge toward national independence is the strongest force of today's world in which we live.

In Africa and Asia and Latin America it is shattering the designs of those who would subdue others to their ideas or their will.

It is eroding the unity of what was once a Stalinist empire.

In recent months a number of nations have cast out those who would subject them to the ambitions of mainland China.

History is on the side of freedom and is on the side of societies shaped from the genius of each people. History does not favor a single system or belief--unless force is used to make it so.

That is why it has been necessary for us to defend this basic principle of our policy, to defend it in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba-and tonight in Vietnam.

For tonight, as so many nights before, young Americans struggle and young Americans die in a distant land.

Tonight, as so many nights before, the American Nation is asked to sacrifice the blood of its children and the fruits of its labor for the love of its freedom.

How many times-in my lifetime and in yours-have the American people gathered, as they do now, to hear their President tell them of conflict and tell them of danger?

Each time they have answered. They have answered with all the effort that the security and the freedom of this Nation required.

And they do again tonight in Vietnam.

Not too many years ago Vietnam was a peaceful, if troubled, land. In the North was an independent Communist government. In the South a people struggled to build a nation, with the friendly help of the United States.

There were some in South Vietnam who wished to force Communist rule on their own people. But their progress was slight. Their hope of success was dim. Then, little more than 6 years ago, North Vietnam decided on conquest. And from that day to this, soldiers and supplies have moved from North to South in a swelling stream that is swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression.

As the assault mounted, our choice gradually became clear. We could leave, abandoning South Vietnam to its attackers and to certain conquest, or we could stay and fight beside the people of South Vietnam.

We stayed.

And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

We will stay because a just nation cannot leave to the cruelties of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence on America's solemn pledge – a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

We will stay because in Asia and around the world are countries whose independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Vietnam would weaken that confidence, would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of aggression. We would have to fight in one land, and then we would have to fight in another – or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists.

And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.

Last year the nature of the war in Vietnam changed again. Swiftly increasing numbers of armed men from the North crossed the borders to join forces that were already in the South. Attack and terror increased, spurred and encouraged by the belief that the United States lacked the will to continue and that their victory was near.

Despite our desire to limit conflict, it was necessary to act: to hold back the mounting aggression, to give courage to the people of the South, and to make our firmness clear to the North. Thus, we began limited air action against military targets in North Vietnam. We increased our fighting force to its present strength tonight of 190,000 men.

These moves have not ended the aggression but they have prevented its success. The aims of the enemy have been put out of reach by the skill and the bravery of Americans and their allies-and by the enduring courage of the South Vietnamese who, I can tell you, have lost eight men last year for every one of ours.

The enemy is no longer close to victory. Time is no longer on his side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment.

Our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace.

In 1965 alone we had 300 private talks for peace in Vietnam, with friends and adversaries throughout the world.

Since Christmas your Government has labored again, with imagination and endurance, to remove any barrier to peaceful settlement. For 20 days now we and our Vietnamese allies have dropped no bombs in North Vietnam.

Able and experienced spokesmen have visited, in behalf of America, more than 40 countries. We have talked to more than a hundred governments, all 113 that we have relations with, and some that we don't. We have talked to the United Nations and we have called upon all of its members to make any contribution that they can toward helping obtain peace.

In public statements and in private communications, to adversaries and to friends, in Rome and Warsaw, in Paris and Tokyo, in Africa and throughout this hemisphere, America has made her position abundantly clear.

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination-that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear.

The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.

This is all we want for South Vietnam. It is all the people of South Vietnam want. And if there is a single nation on this earth that desires less than this for its own people, then let its voice be heard.

We have also made it clear-from Hanoi to New York-that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals-four points or fourteen or forty-and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

We have said all this, and we have asked-and hoped-and we have waited for a response.

So far we have received no response to prove either success or failure.

We have carried our quest for peace to many nations and peoples because we share this planet with others whose future, in large measure, is tied to our own action, and whose counsel is necessary to our own hopes.

We have found understanding and support. And we know they wait with us tonight for some response that could lead to peace.

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming months, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference, or even both at once.

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear. We will act as we must to help protect the independence of the valiant people of South Vietnam. We will strive to limit the conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor do we want to invite increased danger.

But we will give our fighting men what they must have: every gun, and every dollar, and every decision-whatever the cost or whatever the challenge.

And we will continue to help the people of South Vietnam care for those that are ravaged by battle, create progress in the villages, and carry forward the healing hopes of peace as best they can amidst the uncertain terrors of war.

And let me be absolutely clear: The days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle.

There may be some who do not want peace, whose ambitions stretch so far that war in Vietnam is but a welcome and convenient episode in an immense design to subdue history to their will. But for others it must now be clear-the choice is not between peace and victory, it lies between peace and the ravages of a conflict from which they can only lose.

The people of Vietnam, North and South, seek the same things: the shared needs of man, the needs for food and shelter and education-the chance to build and work and till the soil, free from the arbitrary horrors of battle-the desire to walk in the dignity of those who master their own destiny. For many painful years, in war and revolution and infrequent peace, they have struggled to fulfill those needs.

It is a crime against mankind that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams, must be flung on the fires of war and death.

To all of those caught up in this conflict we therefore say again tonight: Let us choose peace, and with it the wondrous works of peace, and beyond that, the time when hope reaches toward consummation, and life is the servant of life.

In this work, we plan to discharge our duty to the people whom we serve.

This is the State of the Union.

But over it all-wealth, and promise, and expectation--lies our troubling awareness of American men at war tonight.

How many men who listen to me tonight have served their Nation in other wars? How very many are not here to listen?

The war in Vietnam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying in the fullness of their promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate.

Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in this world.

Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. But there is a difference. For finally I must be the one to order our guns to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we have children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men to be freed. There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be built, and there is a world to be helped.

Yet we do what we must.

I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires.

Yet as long as others will challenge America's security and test the clearness of our beliefs with fire and steel, then we must stand or see the promise of two centuries tremble. I believe tonight that you do not want me to try that risk. And from that belief your President summons his strength for the trials that lie ahead in the days to come.

The work must be our work now. Scarred by the weaknesses of man, with whatever guidance God may offer us, we must nevertheless and alone with our mortality, strive to ennoble the life of man on earth.

Thank you, and goodnight.

Вопросы:

- Что означает в понимании президента Линдона Джонсона война с бедностью?
- Что президент Линдон Джонсон рекомендовал Конгрессу осуществить при реализации внутренней и внешней политики США?
- Какой уровень дефицита бюджета был предложен президентом Линдоном Джонсоном с учетом экономического роста в США?
- Возможно ли, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, одновременно реализовывать программу «Великого Общества» и вести войну во Вьетнаме?
- В каких трех направлениях («три дороги») реализуется программа «Великого Общества»? Какая, каждому из этих направлений, дается характеристика?
- Что президент Линдон Джонсон подразумевает под политикой по улучшению качества жизни в США?

- Что было предложено президентом Линдоном Джонсоном в вопросе срока полномочий членов Палаты Представителей Конгресса США? Какие приводятся обоснования?

- Какие пять основных принципов, по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона, должны лежать в основе американской политики в отношении войны во Вьетнаме и в целом при реализации внешней политики?

- Что предложил президент Линдон Джонсон строить в отношениях со странами Восточной Европы и почему?

- Каковы по мнению президента Линдона Джонсона причины агрессии против Южного Вьетнама со стороны Северного Вьетнама?

- Как президент Линдон Джонсон объясняет необходимость увеличения американского военного контингента во Вьетнаме до 190 тыс. человек?

- Как президент Линдон Джонсон объясняет свою инициативу о прекращении бомбардировок Северного Вьетнама в течение 20 дней?

Темы презентаций:

- Комитет по ядерному планированию (КПЯ). История создания, деятельность, цели.

- Меморандум Тейлора (22 янв. 1964 г.).

- Мирные инициативы президента Л. Джонсона по урегулированию вьетнамского кризиса.

- Соглашения между США и СССР и др. странами социалистического блока (1966–1968 гг.).

- США и шестидневная война на Ближнем Востоке (июнь 1967 г.). Территориальный вопрос.

- Тетское наступление вьетнамских партизан. (январь 1968 г.). Результат. Психологический эффект.

- Парижские переговоры (май 1968 г.)

Темы рефератов:

- США и ядерная стратегия. НАТО и атлантическая солидарность.

- Политика «наведения мостов» в отношении стран Восточной Европы.

- Идеи программы «Великое Общество» для международных отношений Г. Моргентау.

- Изменение политики в отношении Вьетнама (март 1968 г.) Причины, сущность, последствия. Деамериканизация войны.

- США и антивоенные выступления внутри страны и по всему миру. Сдвиги во внутривластной жизни США.

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ

Период 1950-х – 1960-х гг. – важный этап в развитии послевоенной внешней политики США и кульминационный период Холодной войны, именно тогда были заложены тенденции развития международных отношений на несколько десятилетий вперед. На протяжении 1950-х–60-х гг. происходят заметные сдвиги, формируются новые приоритеты во внешней политике Вашингтона.

В это период реализуются идеи двух внешнеполитических школ США – это «школа реализма», характерная для деятельности республиканской администрации Дуайта Эйзенхауэра, где во главу угла ставятся национальные интересы, и «школа либерального интервенционизма», характерная для демократических администраций, где основное внимание уделяется ценностному подходу и борьбе за распространение и популяризацию западного образа жизни. Анализ предложенных в пособии документов позволяет не только проследить эволюцию внешнеполитических доктрин США, но и увидеть различия в концептуальных подходах двух школ.

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